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This article has three main objectives. The first is to promote an overt, 
objectively rigorous and principled approach to both the discipline and the 
potential of rational relevance as the cornerstone of admissibility, use and 
weight of evidence decisions in common law criminal trials. The second is to 
demonstrate the inadequacy in principle and practice of the traditional common 
law admissibility proxy for probative value of a division between relevance 
to issue and relevance to credit. Both objectives are approached through an 
in-depth examination of the irrational disparities in treatment of decisions 
to lie by prosecution/law enforcement personnel (officers), sexual offence 
complainants and defendants that adherence to the issue/ credit distinction has 
at least facilitated throughout the common law world. The third objective is 
to propose and illustrate the probable implications of an overt, objective and 
principled approach to relevance with the alternative starting point of a division 
between decisions to utter current offence lies and non-current offence lies.
Introduction
Logical (rational) relevance to the proof or disproof of target facts is at 
the core of a modern, rational and principled approach to admissibility 
of forensic evidence in a common law-based legal system.1 Target facts 
include the facts-in-issue, admissibility2 or use condition3 facts and facts 
that are relevant to such facts or to the credibility (veracity) of disputed 
witnesses, the reliability (accuracy) or the probative value of admissible 
evidence. Relevance analysis requires precise identification of target facts 
and items of evidence with express articulation of the relevance argument 
said to connect the two. For this purpose, an item of evidence will be 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. I would like to thank the 
anonymous reviewer for useful insights and my colleague, Professor Simon Young, for introducing 
me to Canadian evidence jurisprudence.
1 Richard Glover and Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13th 
ed., 2011) 5; HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (2003) 6 HKCFAR 135; R v White [2011] 1 SCR 433 
[36]. See also Commonwealth of Australia Evidence Act 1995, ss 55, 56; US Federal Rules of 
Evidence, ss 401, 402; New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, s 7.
2 Facts relevant to the exercise of case management powers and exclusionary discretions are 
included here.
3 This refers to facts as to which a factfinder must be satisfied before acting upon an item of 
evidence.
ARTICLES
HKLJ Vol 45_2014_Part 1.indb   45 11/05/15   2:48 PM
46 Janice Brabyn (2015) HKLJ
rationally relevant to proof of a target fact when the evidence, if accepted, 
is either direct evidence of a target fact or supports an inference which, 
if accepted, would rationally tend to make the existence of that target 
fact more or less probable than it would be without that inference.4 Such 
determination of rational relevance inevitably involves the application 
of the rules of logic/rationality to the much more messy substance of the 
factfinder’s perceptions about and understanding of human experience.5 
The quality of the analysis inevitably depends on the quality of those 
perceptions and understanding.
Rational relevance to the proof or disproof of a target fact as an 
admissibility condition for any proposed item of evidence is a crucial 
limitation that can and should discipline the forensic process.6 Recognition 
of the inclusive potential of rational relevance that would come with 
a preference for fact-sensitive rational relevance and probative value 
assessment over the common law’s strict exclusionary rules approach is 
also important.7 It is the first and fundamental premise of this article that 
an overt, rigorously objective and principled approach towards both the 
potential and the discipline of relevance should be the cornerstone of all 
approaches to the admissibility of prosecution and defence evidence.
This is not to say that rational relevance alone is sufficient. Crucially, 
the presumption of innocence must always be taken seriously. Beyond 
that, the pursuit of justice and the realities of limited temporal resources 
may require that the sufficiency, though not, it is submitted, the discipline 
of logical relevance, be tempered by principled responses to the realities of 
prejudice, susceptibility to issue diversion and fallibility in judgment that 
are part of the human condition. Professor Boyle’s view of relevance as part 
of the law of evidence and of “self-conscious, critical open-mindedness 
4 The express reference to inferences makes explicit what is assumed in standard definitions, 
Evidence Act 1995, s 55; Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence (London: Thomson Reuters, 4th ed., 
2010) 5–6, 13, 62–63; R v White (n 1 above). Express reference to the inference stage of the 
reasoning facilitates understanding as to why evidence that supports the competing stories of 
both parties in ways that cannot be said to make one narrative more probable than the other is 
nonetheless relevant, as in R v Watson (1996) 108 CCC (3d) 310. For further explanation, see 
Michael S Pardo, “The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory” (2013) 66 Vand. L. Rev. 547.
5 Dennis ibid., pp 62–63; R v Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577. 
6 As to the use of logical rather than legal or sufficient relevance for this purpose, see Herman L 
Trautman, “Logical or Legal Relevancy – a Conflict in Theory” (1951–1952) 5 Vand. L. Rev. 
385; Michael Redmayne, “The Relevance of Bad Character” (2002) 61(3) CLJ 684. Note that 
this is not a rejection of overt, systemic discussion of legal relevance and sufficiency of relevance 
as undertaken by Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
12th ed., 2010) 64–73, Dennis (n 4 above), Ch 3. It is the use of these terms, or the phrase 
“relevance is a matter of degree”, as substitutes for overt rational debate or to disguise judgments 
as to sufficiency of weight, even exclusionary rules, that is problematic, see HM Malik (ed), 
Phipson on Evidence (London: Thomas Reuters, 17th ed., 2010) paras 7-06, 7-07. 
7 Lisa Dufraimont, “Realizing the Potential of the Principled Approach to Evidence” (2013) 
39 Queen’s Law Journal 11. Cf. Eleanor Swift, “One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: 
Thayer’s Triumph” (2000) 88 Cal. L. Review 2437.
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about fact finding in context” as the path to a principled approach that 
strives to safeguard against unacceptable levels of “uneven effects” would 
fit well here.8
At the point of admissibility of items of evidence, traditional 
common law distinguishes between relevance to witness credibility only 
and relevance to all other target facts (collectively relevance to issue). 
Inherent in that distinction is an assumption that it is conceptually sound 
and practical to distinguish between the relevance and probative value of 
the fact and content of a witness’s testimony, which determine relevance 
to issue, and its truthfulness. The distinction is then incorporated into 
rules. Evidence classified as relevant to issue is presumptively admissible. 
Evidence classified as relevant to credit only is presumptively restricted. 
The justification for this latter position is primarily an assumption 
of relatively lesser probative value, coupled with concern about 
disproportionate cost/issue diversion and unfair and inhibiting public 
character attacks on witnesses. The second premise of this article is that 
the conceptual soundness and practicality of the relevance to issue/credit 
distinction and the assumption of lesser probative value for credit-only 
evidence are both profoundly problematic. In particular, the relevance 
to issue/credit distinction is in principle and in practice a poor proxy for 
distinguishing between evidence that has significant probative value in 
the resolution of contested factual issues in a particular case and evidence 
that does not. This is especially so when the evidence demonstrates a 
witness’s willingness to lie in the current case and whenever the credibility 
in question is that of a witness whose contested testimony is crucial to the 
determination of a contested factual issue.
Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the disparate 
forensic treatment of implemented decisions to lie9 as items of evidence 
as between three crucial players in the criminal justice process: criminal 
defendants, complainants in sexual offence cases and prosecution/law 
enforcement personnel (“officers”).10 This disparate forensic treatment is 
explored in detail below.
8 Christine Boyle, “A Principled Approach to Relevance: The Cheshire Cat in Canada” in Paul 
Roberts and Michael Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and Proof: Integrating Theory, 
Research and Teaching (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 87.
9 The cumbersome phrase “implemented decision to lie” is used advisedly here since it is precisely 
the decision to utter the particular lie, with its attendant motives and circumstances, and the 
implementation of that decision that is the item of evidence considered. Provided this point is 
always borne in mind, express reference to “implementation” and “decision” can generally be 
omitted.
10 “Officer” here includes any law enforcement officer, civil servant or prosecutor in any way 
connected to the current case but excluding defendants, defence witnesses, defence lawyers or 
complainants.
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The objective is to demonstrate: (i) the irrationality and lack of 
principle in the disparate treatment of the decisions to lie of officers, 
complainants and defendants facilitated by the issue/credit distinction 
and (ii) the superior rationality and principled objectivity of a new 
current/non-current offence distinction as a presumptive starting point 
for evidence admissibility and weight decisions.
Therefore, while the discussion of the relevance and admissibility of 
lies uttered by neutral witnesses who are not officers, complainants or 
defendants follows the relevance to issue/credit analysis, discussion of 
the lies of officers, complainants and defendants specifically is divided 
between “current offence” and “non-current offence” lies.
The term “current offence lie” refers to lies uttered in connection with 
the charged offence, whether before, during, as part of or after commission 
of that offence, at the time of detection or during investigation, 
prosecution or trial. The connection may come from the mind of the 
utterer and/or the current offence context of the lie at the time of uttering. 
Examples include lies uttered for the purpose of obtaining/improving 
evidence of the offence, or in preparation for or to conceal the offence 
and lies uttered when asked about or investigating the current offence, 
even if uttered with an innocent motive. Non-current offence lies are 
lies which, at the time of uttering, have no connection with the offence 
charged, for example, lies in business records adduced in a trial for assault, 
whether adduced as evidence attacking the complainant’s credibility or 
because subsequent discovery of the lies is said to have motivated the 
defendant’s assault.
This current/non-current offence starting point shares common 
ground with the England and Wales (EW) Criminal Justice Act 2003 
(CJA2003), s 98 distinction between “evidence of a person’s bad 
character”, governed by the legislation, and “evidence which (a) has to 
do with the alleged facts of the offence … charged, or (b) is evidence of 
misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that 
offence”, still under the common law.11
11 Glover and Murphy (n 1 above), p 153, citing R v S [2009] EWCA Crim 2457, [33], R v Apabhai 
[2011] EWCA Crim 917, [26]. According to Roderick Munday, “Misconduct that ‘has to do 
with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged’ … more or less” 
[2008] J Crim L 214, the phrase “has to do with” is not as wide as “is relevant to the proof of” 
but judicial interpretations vary as to the required degree of temporal proximity and sufficiency 
of subsequent connection in the form of a motive: R v Neill [2007] EWCA Crim 2927; 
R v Tirnaveanu [2007] EWCA Crim 1239; R v Abdul Rostami [2013] EWCA Crim 1363; 
R v Sule (Sahid) [2013] 1 Cr App R 3; R v Roshan Ara Hussain [2013] EWCA Crim 2015. 
“Current offence” is less open-ended. 
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What Is a Lie?
For the purpose of this article “lies” includes statement lies, that is 
statements of fact or opinion the statement maker believes to be false 
or misleading and intends another person to believe is neither,12 and 
spoliation lies. The term “spoliation lie” is used as a convenient shorthand 
reference to other intentional evidence corrupting behaviours such as 
planting, fabricating, concealing or destroying evidence and subornation 
or suppression of witnesses. Statement and spoliation lies raise similar 
relevance and prejudice issues.13
Lies as separate items of evidence must be distinguished from lies that 
are an integral part of committing the current offence, such as the lies 
inherent in deception or forgery offences or uttered to secure entry to 
target premises. Decisions to lie must also be distinguished from the proof 
effects of proving a lie. Proving a document contains a false statement that 
a transaction occurred precludes reliance upon the statement to prove 
the transaction (proof negation). The evidence that proves the statement 
is false may concurrently prove or disprove a target fact, for example, 
that the transaction did not occur (proof affirmation). Proof effects may 
determine trial outcomes. The evidential value of lies discussed here 
only arises when proof effects are not logically determinative, that is, for 
“non-determinative lies”.
Human Experience and Lies
It is submitted that human experience tells us at least the following about 
lies. No one lies all the time. Some people care a lot about truthfulness, 
others less so.14 Most deliberate lies are uttered for a reason(s) (motive).15 
This latter fact is crucial to the relevance of decisions to lie in our context. 
12 Therefore, all lies are “deliberate” in this context. Statements the maker believed to be false 
but which turned out to be true are lies for present purposes, mistaken inaccuracies, however 
negligent, are not. Falsehoods forced from a person (involuntary) or uttered without an 
intention to deceive are also excluded. The latter would include false statements uttered merely 
to entertain, perhaps also to deflect unofficial curiosity.
13 See R v White (n 1 above); Andrew Palmer, “Guilt and the Consciousness of Guilt: The Use 
of Lies, Flight and Other ‘Guilty Behaviour’ in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime” 
(1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 95, JD Heydon, “Can Lies Corroborate?” (1973) 
89 LQ R 552.
14 Daniel D Blinka, “Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility” (2010) 58 Buff. L. Rev. 
357, 395.
15 Timothy R Levine, Rachel K Kim and Lauren M. Hamel, “People Lie for a Reason: Three 
Experiments Document the Principle of Veracity” (2010) 27(4) Communication Research 
Reports, pp 271, 273, make the point that, psychopathy apart, lying is a tool to achieve a goal, 
not a goal in itself. This is true even for almost reflexive defensive lies, akin to a verbal fight/
hide reflex.
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As to particular motives, many people are sometimes willing to lie to save 
themselves or others from harm (defensive lie); significant numbers are 
sometimes willing to lie for material gain, sometimes notwithstanding 
indirect or incidental financial harm to others (benefit lie); only a 
minority are willing to lie in order to cause or notwithstanding the known 
virtual certainty of causing serious harm to others (malicious lie).16 Note 
that malice in this sense turns otherwise defensive or benefit lies into 
malicious lies.17
Using the language of “comparative propensity” analysis, uttering 
defensive lies would be relatively high base rate behaviour. Uttering 
malicious lies would be low base rate behaviour.18 As with other low 
base rate behaviour, because of its relative rarity, a proven willingness to 
utter and sustain malicious lies, whether before, during or post current 
offence, would distinguish a person from the generality of human kind 
to a degree and in significant ways that willingness to utter defence only, 
even benefit only lies would not. Uttering malicious lies that are also 
perjury or spoliation lies would prove membership of a smaller, even 
more significant subgroup, the subgroup of people who have actually 
deliberately attempted to corrupt the forensic process. As Roger Park 
explained,19 “When a given crime has a low incidence in the general 
population, the probative value of evidence of another instance of the 
same crime will be greater than would have been the case had the crime 
been more common, even if the recidivism rate for the crime is low”. 
Likewise, given a decision to utter a malicious lie has a low incidence in 
the general population or, it is submitted, in a significant subset of the 
population such as officers or complainants, the probative value of proof 
of another instance of a malicious lie to proof of the commission of a 
disputed current offence lie by the same person will be greater than the 
probative value of instances of more common defensive lies.
Any rational forensic argument must also take account of the complex 
nature of character as currently understood. Modern empirical research 
16 The author has no direct empirical confirmation but annual HK Police Review statistics for 
arrests in HK consistently show relatively low numbers of arrests for “misleading/giving false 
information to the police” (220 in 2008, 205 in 2013) and perjury (48 in 2008, 13 in 2013), with 
corresponding numbers for homicide at 42 and 65, serious assault at 4509 and 3619, assaults on 
police at 324 and 283, deception/fraud at 1708 and 1920. Total property crimes exceed 13,000 
in each year. Even accepting perjury is relatively difficult to detect, under enforced and must 
be proved by admission or at least two witnesses, frequency of these offences seems closer to 
homicide and assaults on police than serious violence, deception or theft.
17 Specifically, lies uttered to protect the liar or another from harm but with the hope or knowledge 
that the effect will be to incriminate another or (potentially) impact the forensic process to the 
detriment of another, are malicious lies. 
18 Roger C Park, “Character at the Crossroads” (1998) 49 Hastings Law Journal 717.
19 Ibid., pp 759–760.
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(human experience tested) suggests that, while many individuals do 
develop relatively stable, narrow character traits/preferred behaviours 
and responses as they mature,20 “habit” or system apart, even relatively 
narrow/local character traits are not strong indicators of a person’s past or 
future behaviour at a particular time and place, certainly not if considered 
in isolation. On the contrary, any particular decision to lie or not lie will 
be a product of an interaction between factors internal to the decision 
maker, such as the decision maker’s character, propensities and goals, 
and, crucially, external situational factors.21 If this is correct,22 it does not 
require an extreme form of situationism to conclude that, as a matter of 
logic the strength of any inference that a witness has or has not uttered an 
alleged current offence lie, based on presumed conformity or consistency 
with that witness’s decision(s) to lie at other times (propensity reasoning) 
will be proportional to the degree to which the situational factors that 
were significant in the witness’s other known decision(s) to lie were 
present at the relevant time. Relevant situational factors may include 
presence of a motive, improbability of detection, fear of imminent harm, 
distrust of official questioning, belief in a suspect’s guilt, peer/parental 
pressure, intoxication or the relative formality of the occasion.
Neutral Witnesses:23 Relevance
Suppose a prosecution witness’s testimony that he saw the defendant 
running from the scene of an assault on another person (the charged 
offence). For the witness’s testimony to be a lie, the witness must decide 
(i) to falsely implicate a person in criminal conduct (a malicious lie) (ii) 
while on oath. How might proof of the witness’s other lies be relevant 
to proving he had decided to utter such a lie? Membership of the class 
“human being” carries with it some probability that a witness will lie. 
Therefore, in general terms, the relevance question must be: Does the 
20 John Sabini and Maury Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued” (April 2005) 115(3) 
Ethics 535–562; Redmayne (n 6 above), pp 687–690, Dennis (n 4 above), pp 759–763.
21 Barrett J Anderson, “Recognising Character: A New Perspective on Character Evidence” 
(2012) 121 YLJ 1912, 1931, citing SM Davies, “Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A 
Reassessment of Relevancy” (1991) 27 Crim L. Bull. 504, also cited by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in R v Clarke (1998) 18 CR (5th) 219; Levine, Kim and Hamel (n 15 above), p 273; 
“Uniform Evidence Law”, Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Report 102 (2005) 
[3.9]–[3.25]; Evidence Law: Character and Credibility New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary 
Paper 27 (1997), Ch 3. 
22 There may need to be an allowance for personality evolution over time, see Anderson 
(n 21 above); Avshalom Caspi and Brent W Roberts, “Personality Development across the Life 
Course: The Argument for Change & Continuity” (2001) 12(2) Psychological Inquiry 49–66.
23 As previously stated, neutral witnesses are witnesses who are not parties, complainants or 
officers.
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witness’s other proven lie make it more probable that the witness uttered 
an alleged current offence lie than the assumed probability for witnesses 
generally? A commitment to overt rational relevance precludes a simple 
“yes” or “no”. Overt explanation is required.
Relevance to Credit
Proof that the witness had previously uttered even a multiplicity of 
common content or purely defensive/benefit lies would have insufficient 
situational correlation to support more than very weak credit-related 
propensity arguments such as: “the witness has (often) lied before and so 
the witness might be lying now”. Or “a witness proved to have lied about 
other things is more likely to be lying now than a witness who has not 
been shown to have lied before”. Such inferences would not take us far 
beyond our knowledge of the witness as an ordinary adult member of our 
society.
In contrast, proof that the witness has previously uttered a single lie 
of precisely the kind required, or even proof that the witness has uttered 
either a malicious lie or a lie on oath (perhaps also professional lies or 
callous fraud) tells us a lot more. Demonstrated willingness to lie on oath 
(or upon occasions where truthfulness is a legal obligation) or to cause 
harm, even more so willingness to do both, places the witness within a 
very significant minority class.
First, the decision to lie may have significant imputation plausibility 
value. A factfinder may find it improbable or implausible that a member 
of a respected class to which the witness belongs, a person of the witness’s 
personal standing or people in general would utter malicious lies on oath 
without exceptional cause. Imputation plausibility value is shorthand for 
the tendency of the witness’s proven decision to lie to negate or overcome 
the implausibility of the imputation that this particular witness would lie 
in this particular case as alleged.
Second, since human experience tells us that what a person has 
decided to do once they may well decide to do again, so a past decision 
to lie on oath and/or utter a malicious lie would also alert the factfinder 
as to some degree of increased probability that the witness has decided 
to lie again, and hence some degree of increased risk of error in relying 
upon the unsupported evidence of the witness (warning value). The 
strength of the warning would be proportional to situational similarity, 
being particularly strong where the past decision involved perjury falsely 
implicating another person in a crime.
Probative weight should also generally increase with temporal 
proximity and connection to the current case. The fact of connection 
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with the current case combines very strong situational correlation with 
the strongest possible temporal weight. Even immaterial current offence 
lies tell us something about the witness. Suppose the witness says she saw 
the defendant running from the scene of an assault on the victim when 
she was walking home from work, and it is later proved that the witness 
did not go to work that day and the witness admits that that part of her 
evidence was a lie. Suppose also the motive for the lie was to conceal an 
illicit liaison. Beyond destroying any credit advantage from a consistent 
story, even this current offence lie confirms the probable (the witness 
sometimes tells lies), the less probable (the witness is willing to commit 
perjury) and willingness to lie in the current case, taking the argument 
beyond general credit and character to case-specific credit.
Admittedly, motives such as concealing an illicit liaison are unlikely 
to lead the witness to claim that he had seen the defendant when he knew 
he had not (the alleged malicious lie). Even so, the witness could move 
from neutral and presumptively truthful to partial and presumptively 
suspect. Beyond that, what if there is evidence that the witness is biased 
towards or against a party, or is corrupt24 or that the motive for the lesser 
lie was protection of self or another? Even without proof of the lesser 
lie, the possibility of bias, corruption or interest weighs heavily against 
the witness’s case-specific credibility.25 The imputation plausibility and 
warning value of even the lesser lie would become more significant – a 
last straw perhaps, causing a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 
witness’s testimony must be disregarded.
Relevance to issue
It is one thing to find that a witness is not credible and therefore her 
testimony cannot prove that the defendant did run away from the scene 
of the crime as alleged. It is a much bigger step – although sometimes a 
reasonable step – to say that the witness’s decision to lie about seeing the 
defendant actually makes the defendant’s claim not to have been near 
the scene at all more likely to be true (relevance to issue that does not 
24 KS Brown (ed), McCormick on Evidence (St Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 6th ed., 2006) 70, 
describes bias as “…the powerful distorting effect on human testimony of the witness’s emotions 
or feelings towards the parties or the witness’s self interest in the outcome of the case”. 
“Corruption” is closely related, including financial payoffs and other incentives.
25 However, facts can be complex and need case-by-case analysis. Suppose, eg, the witness lied 
about walking home from work because she had secretly hoped to meet the defendant and 
was actually on route to where she expected him to be. The self-defence motive suggests that 
warning value should not be high but, paradoxically, acceptance of this motive would mean the 
witness was unlikely mistaken in her identification and may in fact add probative value to her 
claim to have seen the defendant.
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engage the witness’s credibility per se). For example, in our hypothetical 
situation, the lie about why the witness was at the scene may lay the 
foundation for an argument that the witness was not near the scene at all 
(and hence could not have seen the defendant).26
Different facts may demonstrate a witness’s fear of the truth or at least 
a felt need to manipulate the forensic process in favour of the witness 
or against the defendant. This will be so if the nature of or motive for 
the indeterminate lie involves concealment of incriminating conduct of 
the witness or an associate in relation to the investigation/prosecution/
commission of the current offence, or concealment of the witness’s 
hostility towards/bias against the defendant or the victim.27 If the liar 
is, or acts for or with the knowledge or acquiescence of a party, thereby 
making the lie the party’s own, uttering the lie admits the weakness of the 
lying party’s case, and demonstrates fear of the non-lying party’s case.28 In 
all such circumstances, relevance to case-specific credit and relevance to 
issue overlap.
Exceptionally, even non-current offence lies could have relevance 
to issue. In our hypothetical situation, proof that the witness had 
previously falsely placed an accused person at the scene of a crime would 
go beyond imputation plausibility and warning value. It would actually 
put the current accused person’s presence at the scene in doubt.29 The 
effect would be magnified with proof of a multiplicity of lies supporting 
inferences of a habit of lying in defined circumstances30 or a system of lies 
or fabrication,31 both behaviours being highly situation-specific.
“Good Faith” Foundation
It is submitted that, since speculative imputations of lies based on nothing 
have no conceivable relevance to anything, only imputations with a good 
26 See Tapper (n 6 above), p 321 (critical discussion of Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd 
(1940) 63 CLR 533) and R (Boston) v Criminal Cases Reserved Commission [2006] EWHC 1966 
(Admin).
27 For an explanation as to why bias is relevant to issue and not merely credit, see United States v 
Abel 469 US 45 (1984), Phillip W Broadland, “Why Bias Is Never Collateral: The Impeachment 
and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Criminal Cases” (2003) 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 235; Mueller 
and Kirkpatrick, Evidence (New York: Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed., 2003) paras 6.19–6.21. 
28 For the clearest exposition, I have found, see JW Strong (ed), McCormick on Evidence (St. Paul, 
MN: West Group, 5th ed., Vol 2, 1999) 179–183. 
29 See also the interesting case of Foran v R [2013] EWCA Crim 437, [35] (use of distinctive 
vocabulary in both a non-current offence alleged fabricated oral admission and current offence 
alleged fabricated oral admission, making the utterance of the disputed admission less probable).
30 “Evidence of habit involves an inference of conduct on a given occasion based on an established 
pattern of past conduct. It is an inference of conduct from conduct…” R v Watson (n 4 above). 
Habits involve repeated, specific responses to the same situation/stimulus. No intervening 
inference as to character is required.
31 A system is a consciously devised and executed plan, procedure or method.
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faith foundation can have relevance to any issue in a trial. The term “good 
faith” is borrowed from the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v Lyttle:32
“In this context, a ‘good faith basis’ is a function of the information available 
to the cross-examiner, his or her belief in its likely accuracy, and the purpose 
for which it is used. Information falling short of admissible evidence 
may be put to the witness. In fact, the information may be incomplete 
or uncertain, provided the cross-examiner does not put suggestions to the 
witness recklessly or that he or she knows to be false. The cross-examiner 
may pursue any hypothesis that is honestly advanced on the strength of 
reasonable inference, experience or intuition. The purpose of the question 
must be consistent with the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court: to suggest 
what counsel genuinely thinks possible on known facts or reasonable 
assumptions is in our view permissible; to assert or to imply in a manner 
that is calculated to mislead is in our view improper and prohibited”.
Provided the adjective “reasonable” extends to experience and intuition, 
the Hong Kong Bar Association Code of Conduct is consistent. The code 
generally permits cross-examination that puts the client’s case and cross-
examination as to credit provided the barrister has “reasonable grounds 
to support” any imputation made. Instructions from the client that an 
imputation is well founded can amount to “reasonable grounds”, whereas 
statements from others need more scrutiny.33
Courts normally rely upon the professional integrity of prosecutors and 
defence counsel to ensure compliance with this admissibility condition, 
buttressed by their professional codes of conduct. However, judges may, 
and in cases of possible prejudice, should ask counsel for assurances as to 
the existence of good faith foundation, inquire into the nature of that 
foundation or conduct a voir dire, if appropriate.34 Unusually, in HKSAR 
v Wong Sau Ming,35 the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) held that where a 
party sought to rely upon an acquittal in another proceeding as evidence 
that a witness in that proceeding has lied, whether the witness had 
indeed been found to have lied must first be decided by the judge as an 
admissibility condition. The rule is discussed below in its usual context of 
officer credibility.
32 [2004] 1 SCR 193, [47]–[48]. 
33 See Code of Practice, paras 130 (obligation not to mislead the court), 131, 138, 139, 147. 
Reliance upon statements from other persons requires the barrister “to ascertain so far as is 
practicable” that the person “can give satisfactory reasons” for the statement, Code of Practice, 
para 139(b).
34 R v Lyttle (n 32 above) [51], [52]. The CJA2003, s 109 provides that “…reference ... to the 
relevance or probative value of evidence is a reference to the relevant or probative value on 
that assumption that it is true”. But this does not mean that the quality of the evidence/factual 
foundation is irrelevant to the ultimate admissibility decision, R v Dizaei [2013] 1 WLR 2257; 
R v Braithwaite [2010] EWCA Crim 1082.
35 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 135.
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Neutral Witnesses: The Law
As noted, evidence perceived to be relevant to issue is prima facie 
admissible. However, counsel and courts have only recently begun to 
perceive and/or openly acknowledge the possible relevance to issue of lies 
by non-parties who are not also alleged victims.36
The practical starting position at trial is that, subject to prosecution 
disclosure duties with respect to any of its witnesses who are of bad character,37 
a witness is accepted as a person (i) of ordinary veracity (ii) without any 
particular reason to lie in the current case. Even when a witness’s current 
offence veracity is in issue, neither party may lead evidence solely relevant 
to that witness’s veracity, whether to bolster or impeach.38
However, any party may use good faith cross-examination of any 
witness (other than a defendant) whose credit is in issue, imputing 
bad conduct to the witness, to undermine or disprove either ordinary 
veracity or real neutrality (intrinsic impeachment). Attacks may target 
the witness’s general or case-specific credit, inviting a factfinder to take 
all or any of the relevance to credit positions previously outlined. Any 
imputed conduct must be such that, if accepted, it “…would materially 
affect the court’s opinion as to the witness’s veracity on the subject matter 
of his testimony…”.39 The imputation must not be “... so remote in time 
or of such a kind that the truth of the imputation would not have any 
material impact on the court’s assessment of the witness’s veracity”.40 
Most of the criticism of such impeachment concerns cross-examination 
targeting general credibility using convictions for offences not requiring 
proof of lying or other dishonesty. Good faith imputations of a witness’s 
current offence lies and non-current offence perjury, evidence spoliation, 
malicious accusations, even criminal deception are an accepted basis for 
impeachment.41
In addition, there is a blunt case management tool, the collateral 
finality/fact rule. The rule prohibits any extrinsic rebuttal evidence on 
collateral matters, requiring the opposing party to accept a witness’s 
answers to questions about collateral matters as final – although not 
36 R v Murray [1995] RTR 239; R v Gadsby [2006] Crim LR 631; R v Arcangioli [1994] 1 SCR 129; 
R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400, [32] (Thomas JA); cf. [9] (McPherson JA).
37 See Statement of Prosecution Policy and Practice, para 18.13 and HKSAR v Chan Kau Tai [2006] 
1 HKLRD 400.
38 Cheung Ying-Lun v Government of Australia [1990] 2 HKLR 732; R v Colwill [2002] EWCA Crim 
1320.
39 HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) [25], citing Hobbs v CT Tinling and Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1, 
51; R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Crim App R 316. 
40 Ibid.
41 A Bruce and G McCoy, Criminal Evidence in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: LexisNexis Hong Kong, 
2010) para 705; R v Corbett [1988] 1 SCR 670 [52]–[55] (La Forest J).
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necessarily as truthful or accurate.42 A comprehensive definition of what 
is meant by “collateral” has proved elusive. One court, significantly in the 
context of a complainant’s lies famously concluded that the distinction 
was “... an instinctive one based on the prosecutor’s and the court’s sense 
of fair play...”.43 At least there is agreement that a witness’s general credit 
is clearly collateral and facts-in-issue, admissibility or use condition facts 
are not.44 Evidence relevant to weight is again in limbo. Classifying 
matter perceived as relevant to a witness’s case-specific credit has proved 
especially problematic.45 As one judge observed: “… a matter going to 
the credit of a witness in a criminal case cannot be said to be collateral to 
the vital issue … especially where … the witness in question provides the 
only evidence upon that issue”.46
Inevitably, the collateral finality rule is subject to recognised exceptions: 
criminal convictions/formal disciplinary findings;47 previous inconsistent 
statements “relative to the subject- matter of the proceedings”48 and facts 
suggesting current offence bias or corruption.49 In HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming, 
42 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91, 154 ER 506; HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above); 
R v Krause (1986) 2 SCR 466 (SCC); R v Clarke 2009 CarswellOnt 628; Nicholls v The Queen; 
Coates v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196.
43 Henry J in R v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587. Note the curious absence of defence counsel’s sense 
of fair play. The most widely quoted definition is in Attorney-General v Hitchcock (n 42 above), 
99: “[I]f the answer of a witness is a matter which …has such a connection with the issues, that 
you would be allowed to give it in evidence – then it is a matter on which you may contradict 
him …” which include matters “directly affecting the story of the witness touching the issue 
before [factfinder] and those matters which affect the motives, temper and character of the 
witness, …with reference to his feelings towards [a Party]”. Henry J in R v Funderburk described 
this as “circular” but it is cited literally throughout the common law world. S Casey Hill, David 
M Tanovich and Louis P Strezos (ed), McWilliam’s Canadian Criminal Evidence (Ontario: Canada 
Law Book, 2008) para 6:20; JD Heydon, Cross on Evidence: 7th Australian Edition (Chatswood 
NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths 2004) paras 17580–17585; Don L Mathieson, Cross on Evidence 
New Zealand Version (Wellington: LexisNexis New Zealand, 8th ed. , 2005) 291. 
44 HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) [26], [38]; R v Krause (n 42 above); Nicholls v The Queen; 
Coates v The Queen (n 42 above) [38]. 
45 See Tiwari v Trinidad and Tobago [2002] UKPC 29, [22]–[29] (a sexual offence identity issue case, 
follows R v Funderburk line), R v TM [2004] EWCA Crim 2085, [24]–[39] (allegations of offers 
of money to witness complainants by TP hostile to D, judge denying admissibility is a matter 
of labels, “… not a mechanical exercise, but is one designed to achieve fairness…”); R v Alders 
[1993] 2 SCR 482; David M Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (Toronto: Irwin 
Law Inc, 5th ed., 2008) 434–441; Hill, Tanovich and Strezos (n 43 above) [6: 60], [6:70].
46 R v Knightsbridge Crown Court, Ex parte Goonatilleke [1986] QB 1 (witness was store detective, 
effective prosecutor and chief witness).
47 As to disciplinary findings, see HKSAR v Chan Kau Tai (n 37 above) [53]–[55]; R v Guney [1998] 
2 Cr App R 242, 259. The exception is to proof of extrinsic evidence only. The convictions or 
disciplinary findings must still pass the relevance to credit test, R v Sweet-Escott (n 39 above).
48 See Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8), ss 12–14. Previous inconsistent statements are not a real 
exception since such statements must be relative to a matter in the proceedings. If not so 
relevant, collateral finality applies. 
49 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (n 42 above); R v Lawrence (n 36 above) [32]–[36]; Ron Delisle, 
Don Stuart and David Tanovich, Evidence: Principles and Problems (Ontario: Thomson Carswell, 
8th ed., 2007) 587–594.
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the CFA added judicially confirmed findings that a witness had lied in 
another proceeding.50
Beyond this, HK judges may use case management powers to prevent 
unnecessarily offensive or repetitive imputations,51 and judicial discretion 
to exclude prosecution evidence to ensure a fair trial, specifically 
excessively prejudicial prosecution52 evidence. The accepted test is whether 
the prejudicial effect of such evidence may/is likely to/will outweigh its 
probative value. Prejudicial effects occur when the nature of an item 
of relevant evidence causes a factfinder to give irrational relevance or 
excessive weight (reasoning prejudice) or, from revulsion or condemnation 
against a party or witness, to alter the standard of proof or even abandon 
neutral evaluation of evidence altogether (moral prejudice), distorting, 
even corrupting the fact-finding process.53 Prejudicial reasoning of either 
kind is inherently inconsistent with fair, evidence-based proceedings.54 
Proof, even denied imputations, of some lies risk prejudicial effects of 
these kinds for some witnesses.55
Surely such open-ended judicial judgment and/or discretion invite 
“uneven effects”.56
EW CJA2003 s 100 now controls the admissibility of bad character 
evidence of non-defendants in EW. Both issue/credibility distinctions and 
collateral finality are replaced by requirements for prior judicial leave and 
a higher admissibility threshold, that is, “substantial probative value” in 
relation to a matter in issue which matter is of “substantial importance in 
the context of the case as a whole”.57 Application is a matter of judgment 
without residual discretion. Some judges stress departure from the 
common law, a more demanding standard,58 others not so much.59
50 HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) [37]–[39]. The CFA recognised that it had departed from 
English precedent.
51 Hobbs v CT Tinling and Co Ltd (n 39 above); Bruce and McCoy (n 41 above) [X: 555–602]; 
R v Lyttle (n 32 above) [43].
52 Secretary for Justice v Lam Tat Ming (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168; R v Lui Mei-Lin [1989] 1 HKLR 245 
(PC). A similar Canadian discretion extends to defence evidence, R v Arcangioli (n 36 above). 
53 Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Misconduct of a Defendant, Law Commission Consultation 
Paper No. 141 (1996) paras 7.2–7.15 and see Dennis (n 4 above) paras 18.7–18.9.
54 Secretary for Justice v Lam Tat Ming (n 52 above).
55 Victor Gold, “Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct Evidence to 
Impeach” (2008) 36 Southwestern UL Rev 769, 775–776.
56 Christine Boyle (n 8 above).
57 “[I]mportant explanatory evidence” and evidence agreed by the parties is also admissible.
58 R v Harvey [2014] EWCA Crim 54 (unproven allegations in police records excluded); 
R v Braithwaite (n 34 above) (seldom allow imputations not supported by evidence); R v Francis 
(Robert) [2013] EWCA Crim 2313 (convictions too old/lacked factual similarity); R v Dizaei 
(n 34 above) (lies maintained on oath were relevant); R v Garnham [2008] EWCA Crim 266 
[12] (65 theft convictions of complainant excluded, limited value of common law precedent). 
59 R v TM Jarvis [2008] EWCA Crim 488 [30] (no reason to restrict to perjury, testimony relating 
to employment/commercial dishonesty); R v Brewster [2011] 1 WLR 601 (“worthy of belief” as 
an aspect of character generally, similar to common law approach). 
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Current Offence Lies
Officers
The rules of evidence formerly treat officers as ordinary witnesses,60 
myopically ignoring the fact and implications of their relationship 
with the accusing party: officer control over many detection and most 
investigation, arrest, detention and evidence-gathering/-creating/-
recording/-presentation processes; the nature of many factual disputes 
as essentially officer versus defendant swearing contests and an 
officer’s professional and personal interest in public encounter and 
trial outcomes61 – all sources of pressure on the forensic process that 
warrant special vigilance.62 Instead, there is an unsanctioned tendency 
to give officers a varying degree of exceptional “credibility plus”, that 
is, prosecution witnesses who are officers are said to be more credible 
and less likely to lie than other witnesses.63 Defendants face substantial 
practical difficulty in creating even a reasonable doubt that an officer has 
uttered a current offence lie.64 They are cramped by consistent emphasis 
on the discipline rather than the potential of relevance of officers’ 
non-determinative lies.
Considered objectively, any officer’s decision to utter a current offence 
lie for any reason should prevent any possibility of a credibility plus. 
Any current offence lie demonstrating willingness to distort the forensic 
process or deceive superiors or the court, including offers, solicitations, 
attempts or conspiracies to commit such lies, should have strong 
imputation plausibility, and warning value sufficient to conclude an 
officer’s unsupported testimony cannot be accepted as proving disputed 
60 R v Francis (Devon Lloyd) [2011] EWCA Crim 375, [35], following R v Gueny (n 47 above). Cf. 
R v Knightsbridge Crown Court, Ex parte Goonatilleke (n 46 above); R v McNeil [2009] 1 SCR 
66, [14]. Some judges and commentators do refer to officers who allege the defendant assaulted 
them as “complainants”.
61 It is common sense that high arrest, charging and conviction rates are good for law enforcement 
careers. For less obvious sources of personal commitments to outcomes, see “The Victorian 
Armed Offenders Squad – a Case Study”, produced by the Australian state of Victoria’s Office 
of Police Integrity, October 2008, P.P. No. 134 (VAOS); Barry Wright, “Civilianising the ‘Blue 
Code’? An Examination of Attitudes to Misconduct in the Police Extended Family’ (2010) 
12(3) Int. J. of Pol. Science and Management 339; Keith A Findley and Michael S Scott, “The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases” (2006) Wis. L. Rev. 91. 
62 See HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) (Bokhary PJ).
63 Appellate courts regularly appeal for judicial neutrality: Lee Fuk-Hing v HKSAR (2004) 7 
HKCFAR 600; HKSAR v Chan Kwok Wah (CACC 276/2008); Bentley (deceased) [2001] 1 Cr 
App R 21; R v Lonie; R v Groom [1999] NSWCCA 319 [69]–[73]; R v Flis (2006) 205 CCC 
(3d) 384.
64 O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534. Without independent evidence, 
such as supporting video, defendants have almost no chance, see VAOS (n 61 above); HKSAR v 
Hau Chau Sing (CACC 142/2012); Geoffrey P Alpert and Jeffrey J Noble, “Lies, True Lies and 
Conscious Deception” XX(X) Police Quarterly 1, 2.
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facts beyond all reasonable doubt.65 Circumstances could implicate other 
officers.66 Lying to convict the “guilty” is not an innocent motive here.67
However, beyond this, a real possibility of corruption, bias or 
liability motives, as where an officer is suspected of lying to earn a 
bribe, enhance the evidence or to conceal improper conduct (racial 
profiling, excess violence, evidence spoliation or unlawful search or 
arrest), logically collapses the distinction between relevance to case-
specific credit and issue. Uttering such partial material post-fact lies 
may well show the officer’s consciousness of weakness of the accusing 
party’s case and/or of at least consistency of the suppressed evidence/
circumstances with the defendant’s innocence sufficient to amount to 
evidence of such weakness or possible innocence. As Professor Cynthia 
Jones cogently explains,68 recognition of this does not impose additional 
burdens upon officers as witnesses or in the course of their work. Rather, 
it simply refrains from shielding officers from the forensic consequences 
of current offence conduct applied to everyone else.69
In practice, however, in EW and HK, although good faith intrinsic 
attacks imputing officer current offence lies are accepted as relevant to 
credibility, many judges have had difficulty in seeing relevance beyond 
credibility, thereby closing the door to extrinsic evidence even in rebuttal 
of denials.70 The 1982 EW case of R v Busby71 – and its treatment by 
subsequent courts – is instructive. Busby’s allegations of confession 
fabrication (disputed officer current offence lie 1) and intimidation of a 
defence witness by an officer (disputed officer current offence lie 2) were 
put to the officer and were denied (disputed officer current offence lie 3). 
65 R v Guede [2005] CarswellQue 9491 is a good illustration but cf. R v Usereau [2010] Carswell
Que 4219. 
66 See, eg, HKSAR v Leung Tat Ming NKCC 7674/1997, the “other proceedings” in HKSAR v Wong 
Sau Ming (n 1 above) and Lord Wolfe’s approach in G Mills, A Poole v Criminal Cases Review 
Commission [2001] EWHC Admin 1153, [116]–[117]. Cf. R v Mills; R v Poole (No 2) [2003] 1 
WLR 2931; A Stock v R [2004] EWCA Crim 2238; R v JL Dunn [2009] EWCA Crim 1371.
67 On the contrary, such conduct underlines lawlessness as part of the officer’s approach but 
convincing the system of this (officers, judges and factfinders) is an uphill task, Russell Covey, 
“Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions” (2013) 90 Wash. U.L. Rev. 1133.
68 Cynthia E Jones, “A Reason to Doubt: Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence” 
(2010) 100 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 415. 
69 Ibid., 457–458, “While it is ‘universally conceded’ that the defendant’s conduct in manipulating 
and suppressing evidence is admissible to establish the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, there 
are very few criminal cases applying the ‘consciousness of a weak case’ inference to similar acts 
of evidence suppression by the government in violation of Brady”. See also R v Boyd [2006] 11 
WWR 721 (MBQB) (officer’s false allegations of being harassed by the defendant supporting 
inference of officer’s bias against defendant and inference that alleged assault by defendant did 
not happen); Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125, 157 (Kirby J) (“…the nondisclosure 
and suppression of evidence … could be viewed, of itself, as casting doubt on the reliability of 
the ‘confessions’ …”).
70 Cf. R v Emmanuel (1997) CarswellOnt 5787, R v Boyd, ibid. (rule subordinate to the interests of 
justice, voir dires held where relevance perceived as going to credit only).
71 (1982) 75 Crim App R 79.
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However, the trial judge invoked collateral finality to prevent Busby from 
adducing the defence witness’s testimony to rebut this last denial. On 
appeal the Court of Appeal (EWCA) held:72
“It is not always easy to determine when a question relates to facts that 
are collateral only … and when it is relevant to the issue that has to be 
tried…. [The question to the defence witness should have been permitted] 
If true it would have shown that the [officers in the case] were prepared 
to go to improper lengths to secure [the defendant’s conviction. It was 
the defendant’s case] … that the [incriminating] statement attributed to 
him [by the officers] had been fabricated, a suggestion which could not be 
accepted by the jury unless they thought that the officers concerned were 
prepared to go to improper lengths to secure a conviction”.
The EWCA recognised that Busby was primarily interested in the proof 
affirmation effects of proving the officer’s lie 3, that is, proof of the officer’s 
lie 2. The officer’s attempt to intimidate the defence witness would 
be after-the-fact conduct showing not only the officer’s unprincipled 
determination to secure the defendant’s conviction, thereby destroying 
the officer’s credit with evidence of bias/corruption (strong imputation 
plausibility and warning value) but also of the officer’s fear of the defence 
witness’s evidence generally, thereby increasing the probability of officer 
lie 1 and/or the defendant’s innocence, depending upon the expected 
content of the defence witness’s evidence.73
The EWCA’s decision in R v Busby has been cited as indicating 
increased EWCA liberality in the application of the collateral finality 
rule in modern times,74 possible authority for a new exception to the 
collateral finality rule for evidence “that [these] police are prepared to go 
to improper lengths to secure a conviction [in this case]”,75 an extension of 
or clearly within the bias or corruption exceptions76 or just plain wrong.77 
In truth, it was entirely consistent with the 17th-century acceptance of 
such evidence as evidence of bias in the Trial of William Viscount Stafford,78 
72 Ibid., p 82.
73 See Rosemary Pattenden, “Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v 
Edwards” [1992] Crim LR 549, 551; R v Marsh (1986) Cr App R 165.
74 Tapper (n 6 above), p 362, an earlier version of which was approved in Tiwari v Trinidad and 
Tobago (n 45 above) [28]. 
75 R v Funderburk (n 43 above), p 591.
76 R v Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207; Glover and Murphy (n 1 above) para 17.10.1; R v C(JA) 
[1998] CarswellOnt 5210; Hill, Tanovich and Strezos, (n 43 above) [6:80.20], nn 162, 166 
(corruption).
77 R v Edwards, ibid. (if not a bias case); Heydon (n 43 above) [19030], citing Goldsmith v Sandilands 
(2002) 190 ALR 370, [41] (McHugh J) (HCt) and R v Roberts and Urbanec [2004] VSCA 1, [91]. 
78 (1680) 7 How St Tr 1293 (defendant permitted to call a defence witness to prove that a 
prosecution witness offered the defence witness money to give evidence against the defendant as 
proof of bias/corruption of the prosecution witness, acceptance not an admissibility condition).
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expressly approved in Attorney-General v Hitchcock79 and Nicholls v The 
Queen.80 Indeed, it was in short, a liability lie. Collateral finality was 
beside the point.
Finally, in the recent HK case of HKSAR v So Kon Tung,81 admittedly 
not a lies case but still on point, the HKCA got it completely right. So Kon 
Tung’s two videoed confessions were admitted against him in a murder 
trial notwithstanding his evidence, with medical support, that they were 
obtained after violence and oppression by named officers. On appeal, the 
defendant complained of culpable non-disclosure by the prosecution of an 
independent complaint to the Complaints Against Police Office alleging 
somewhat similar violence by the same named officers against another 
unrelated suspect (later exonerated) in relation to the same case and on 
the same day.82 The impact of that non-disclosure on appeal depended in 
part upon whether the non-adjudicated complaint and/or the testimony 
of the other suspect would have been admissible in So’s trial. That in turn 
depended upon recognition that the substance of both would have been 
not merely relevant to the credibility of the officers but also relevant to 
the actual proof of the admissibility fact of voluntariness by way of proof 
of the officers’ closely related conduct and intentions. It is to the HKCA’s 
credit that they were not misled by the prosecution’s credit-only rigidity. 
As Stock VP explained:
“The cases establish that the line between calling evidence going only to 
credit as opposed to addressing the issue in the case is not always an easy 
one to draw but in the circumstances which we have particularised – and 
the question is always fact and context specific – we are satisfied that cross-
examination about what happened to [suspect 2] that night would be cross-
examination as to an issue in the case and that, further, it would be open 
for the defence to call [suspect 2]”.
It is submitted that if fabrication of confession evidence had been 
the common feature, the complaint would have been relevant to the 
admissibility and/ or use issue in HKSAR v So Kon Tung in the same way.83
79 (1847) 1 Exch 91, 101, 154 ER 506. 
80 (2005) 219 CLR 196, 291 (Hayne, Heydon JJ). Writers Jonathan Doak and Claire McGourlay, 
Criminal Evidence in Context (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2nd ed., 2009) 137, suggest that R 
v Busby is now accepted as in line with earlier perverting the course of justice cases but cite no 
authority.
81 [2010] 5 HKLRD 101.
82 Ibid., [38]. 
83 Cf. R v Lam Wai Keung [1994] 2 HKCLR 9; R v Lee Man Liu [1992] 2 HKCLR 41 
(relevance to credit accepted, relevance to issue never raised). This was typical of HK cases 
before HKSAR v So Kon Tung. Cf. Stock VP’s rejection of the “credit-only” position in 
R v Edwards (n 76 above) as of “scant relevance” to HKSAR v So Kon Tung’s facts.
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Complainants
Although no longer formally a party in the criminal trials of their cases, 
complainants’ interest in the outcome is significant and apparent and, like 
officers, they are often the central prosecution witness, effectively bearing 
the burden of proof. However, unlike officers, complainants, especially 
sexually active/unconventional/unattractive complainants, do not enjoy 
a general credit plus. Indeed, all complainants are uniquely vulnerable to 
prejudicial judgments based on irrational beliefs about sexual behaviour 
and credibility, probable consent and moral worth.84
Rationally, the starting point should be that the complainant’s sexual 
experience/preferences not connected to the current offence are simply 
irrelevant to any issues in the trial, including witness credibility.85 Neither 
the prosecution nor the defence should seek to adduce such evidence.86 
Nevertheless, some complainants choose to do so. If they also choose 
to lie, it is not clear why the sexual content of the lie requires special 
treatment, protective of complainants or otherwise.87
In practice, where a complainant volunteers88 a current offence 
history/preference lie, as where a complainant falsely claims virginity, 
marital fidelity or refusal to have sex in relevant circumstances, with 
the express object of supporting a claim of no consent, this is commonly 
and rightly seen as potentially relevant to issue as well as credit and is 
open to rebuttal.89 Some “rape shield” laws expressly,90 or as interpreted91 
84 Elisabeth McDonald, “From ‘Real Rape’ to Real Justice? Reflections on the Efficacy of More 
than 35 Years of Feminism, Activism and Law Reform” (2014) 45 Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev. 
487; Jason CF Chan, “Making the Courtroom a Better Place for the Complainants: Rape Shield 
Law in Hong Kong and the Road Ahead” (2010) 4 HKJLS 15; Liz Kelly, Jennifer Tempkin and 
Sue Griffiths, “Section 41: An Evaluation of New Legislation Limiting Sexual History Evidence 
in Rape Trials”, Home Office Online Report 20/06; Christine Boyle, “Reasonable Doubt in 
Credibility Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual Equality” [2009] E and P 269; R v Seaboyer 
(n 5 above) [647e]–[670a] (L’Heureux-Dube J).
85 Liat Levanon, “Sexual History Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault: A Critical Re-Evaluation” 
(2012) 62 U. Toronto L. J. 609 makes a convincing argument to this effect – except in one very 
limited circumstance.
86 Admittedly, silence on this subject may cause jury speculation and leave space for jurors to 
reject the intended message of rape shield laws in favour of their “real rape” stories; I Bennet 
Capers, “Real Women, Real Rape” (2013) 60 UCLA L. Rev. 826. 
87 Except, perhaps, in terms of a judicial direction, carefully addressing such probative value as 
there is.
88 Cf. R v Hamadi (Zeeyad) (2008) 8 Crim LR 635 (lies uttered in cross-examination only).
89 R v S [2003] EWCA Crim 485 (virginity); R v Riley [1991] Crim LR 460 (“I wouldn’t willingly 
have sex with my daughter in the room”). Would an officer’s lie of meticulous recordkeeping in 
order to support a claim that absence of a record means an event did not happen, also be accepted 
as relevant to issue?
90 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 41(5); NZ 2006, s 44 and see ALRC Report 
102 (n 21 above), Ch 20.
91 Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200), s 154 as interpreted in Cheung Moon Tong v R [1981] HKLR 
402 (CA); Federal Rules of Evidence, s 412 as to which see Mueller and Kirkpatrick 
(n 27 above), para 4.33, p 272. As to Canada, see Susan Chapman, “Section 276 of the Criminal 
Code and the Admissibility of ‘Sexual Activity’ Evidence” (1999) 25 Queen’s L.J. 121, 165–168.
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recognise this. In the leading case of R v Funderburk, this approach was 
applied to the implicit loss of virginity central to a young complainant’s 
moving testimonial account of unlawful intercourse with the defendant. 
Evidence the complainant was not a virgin at the time of that alleged act 
was perceived as going beyond credibility to bringing the occurrence of 
the incident itself directly into question.92
Unfortunately, the analysis in R v Funderburk was distorted by the 
perceived need to consider the previous inconsistent statements exception 
to collateral-finality, leading the EWCA to observe:93
“Evidence [in sexual offence cases] is often effectively limited to that of the 
parties, and much is likely to depend on the balance of credibility between 
them. This has important effects for the law of evidence since it is capable 
of reducing the difference between questions going to credit and questions 
going to the issue to vanishing point…”. (Emphasis added)
Certainly, any difference in weight between such questions can be reduced 
to vanishing point in one-on-one credibility contests like these where 
credibility is everything.94 Where the lie permeates the testimony, as in R v 
Funderburk, or is motivated by a desire to support assertions of intercourse 
or “no consent”, even the conceptual difference between issue and credit 
collapses. Collateral finality ought not to be engaged.
But surely all this is true for many officer–defendant encounters and is 
not distinctive to sexual offence cases per se.
In fact, judicial openness to relevance to issue for complainants’ lies 
goes further, extending to almost any lie with sex-related content. Such 
an approach ignores the known fact that many complainants lie about 
their sex-related conduct simply to protect their own and others’ privacy 
and/or to avoid unfair prejudicial judgments with no thought of distorting 
the forensic process.95 In such cases, the fact of the lie may be “relevant 
to credibility” but the complainant’s sexual history, and therefore any 
lie about it, remains a collateral issue and should be treated as such. 
Unfortunately, judges do not seem to appreciate this. The passage quoted 
above has been cited, and it or similar sentiments relied upon, as justifying 
92 R v Funderburk (n 43 above), p 597; DPP v GK [2006] IE CCA 99; R v Toms (2001) 210 Nfld 
and PEIR 343 (SC).
93 R v Funderburk, ibid., 597H–598A, in turn derived from Cross on Evidence (6th ed.), now Tapper 
(n 6 above), p 330, also approved in R v Nagrecha [1997] 2 Cr App R 401, 406; R v Tobin [2003] 
EWCA Crim 190; R v Lawrence (n 36 above) [13].
94 S Seabrooke, “The Vanishing Trick – Blurring the Line between Credit and Issue” [1999] Crim 
LR 387.
95 See Louise Ellison, “Promoting Effective Case-Building in Rape Cases: A Comparative 
Perspective” [2007] Crim L.R. 691–708, as to reasons for complainant’s sexual history lies and 
how to deal with them. 
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rebuttal in sexual offence cases where possible lies about sexual history in 
particular have no separate relevance to issue at all.96
In addition, imputations of complainant’s current offence lies 
raise many of the good faith foundation and proof problems raised by 
imputations of other false allegations, discussed below. It seems, not all 
prosecution witnesses are equal.97
Defendants
Defendants are formal parties in their own criminal trials, the only persons 
permitted to choose to remain silent and uncooperative throughout the 
whole investigation and trial. Since guilty defendants who speak have 
strong motives to utter exculpatory lies, although the presumption of 
innocence precludes both heightened scrutiny of a defendant’s testimony 
on the ground of interest alone98 and conviction based solely on a 
defendant’s lies,99 a defendant’s non-determinative current offence lies 
require discussion.
Relevance
At a minimum, defendants’ current offence lies (i) preclude a consistent 
story advantage; (ii) confirm that the defendant belongs to the large class 
of persons sometimes willing to utter defensive lies when questioned 
about or faced with incriminating evidence of criminality and/or the 
presumably smaller but still substantial class willing to utter defensive 
lies in court; (iii) demonstrate that the defendant is sometimes willing 
to lie in the current case. But the current offence significance of these 
facts is hugely variable. The weight of spontaneous lies quickly retracted 
96 See Cheung Moon Tong v The Queen (n 91 above) (rebuttal of second girl’s denial of intercourse 
within last week not relevant to issue but should have allowed cross-examination: “If counsel for 
the defence had been able to shake her on that, it is conceivable that the jury might have begun 
to have doubts upon other matters”. Collateral finality was not mentioned). See also HKSAR 
v Cheung Hok Man [2011] 3 HKLRD 810, [34]–[35] (quashing conviction for failure to admit 
testimony that might have led to evidence that the complainant’s description of post-offence 
conduct was false: “The only prosecution evidence relevant to the core issue of whether sexual 
intercourse had taken place came from the female victim’s testimony. Her credibility, which 
was a material issue in the case, had a significant bearing on determining the core issue …”). 
Cf. R v Winter [2008] EWCA Crim 3; R v B [2012] EWCA Crim 1235.
97 Cf. the treatment of evidence of a complainant’s distress by the CFA in Leung Chi Keung v 
HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 526, [28]–[31] (jury to be directed could only use complainant’s 
distress as tending to prove the complaint if satisfied distress was (i) genuine and (ii) solely 
attributable to the abuse. With respect, this goes too far in the opposite direction. A real 
possibility the distress was feigned must have important implications for assessments of a 
complainant’s credibility, even directly as to issue. And a factfinder could only be satisfied that 
distress was caused by the alleged sexual offence if first satisfied as to the offence itself).
98 R v Robinson (1991) 55 A Crim R 318, 321 (HC), adopted in R v Leung Kit Chun Criminal 
Appeal 291/1993 (HKCA).
99 Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR (2003) 6 HKCFAR 113 (CFA).
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and/or (possibly) attributable to innocent motives may be slight.100 
More considered, sustained or multiple testimonial lies could destroy a 
defendant’s case-specific credibility as a witness.101
Beyond credit, some defendants’ non-determinative/partial material 
lies support an inference of the defendant’s attempt to conceal the 
defendant’s guilt – an ironic use of an exculpatory statement/spoliation.102 
Inculpatory effects are greatest when the content and circumstances 
comprising and surrounding a defendant’s lie are inconsistent with the 
defendant’s belief that the defendant did not commit the offence, or at 
least strongly suggest that the defendant acted because of a belief the 
defendant had committed the current offence.103 However, although 
some lies have stand-alone “consciousness of guilt” motive relevance to 
issue in this way, for most lies motive is less certain.
Motive uncertainty arises because significant proportions of innocent, 
especially relatively innocent people,104 especially when questioned in 
compromising or suspicious circumstances, on the periphery of “trouble” or 
simply by “one of them”, hide incriminating objects, flee or utter panicky, 
ill-advised false denials of identity, proximity, past presence, acquaintance 
or relevant knowledge, possession or perception (defensive lies).105 Even 
sustained and/or complex lies may arise from fear of wrongful conviction 
or the desire to protect another, preserve one’s own or another’s privacy 
or bolster a truthful but unsupported denial.106
Consequently, even if it is clear that a defendant’s deliberate lie about 
Fact A or Fact B was motivated by belief in the incriminating character of 
Fact A or exculpatory character of Fact B, whether the defendant feared 
just/wrongful conviction and of what may be much less certain. Such 
motive ambiguity inevitably affects weight. Motive ambiguity may even 
preclude logical relevance to a particular issue altogether if innocent and 
guilty motives with respect to that issue are “equally” plausible, as where 
100 Ibid.; R v Ford 2002 YKTC 9 (CanLII) (common initial denial of alcohol consumption by 
defendants in alcohol driving cases did not deserve substantial weight); R v Cherrington and 
Dinsdale (1984) 1 CRNZ 169 (CA). 
101 R v Reszpondek [2010] EWCA Crim 2358; R v Wood [2007] EWCA Crim 1556; R v Henson 
[1998] EWCA Crim 1834; R v Russo (No 2) [2006] VSCA 297. 
102 David Hamer, “‘Hoist with His Own Petard’? Guilty Lies and Ironic Inferences in Criminal 
Proof” (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 377, 378.
103 R v PD Wong [1993] 1 HKCLR 62 (HKCA) (lies to neighbours as to the cause of smells caused 
by V’s decaying body before questioning by officers); R v Azzam 2008 ONCA 467 (pre-offence 
setting up/post-offence assertion of false alibi); R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236 (pretence of concern 
about missing victim after knowledge of death); R v Toia [1982] 1 NZLR 555.
104 Those not guilty of the specific current offence but having something else to hide, Bullen v R 
[2008] 2 Cr App R 364, [42].
105 R v Burge; R v Pegg (1996) 1 Cr App R 163; Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1.
106 R v Richens (1994) 98 Cr App R 43; R v Middleton [2000] Crim LR 251; R v Nguyen [2005] 
VSCA 120, [28]; R v Samuels [1985] 1 NZLR 350.
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there is no forensic reason to find a defendant’s initial false denial of 
striking the deceased more consistent with murder than manslaughter 
(intractable motive neutrality).107
Instructions and Use Restrictions108
The first point seems the most difficult for trial judges on the day. Suppose 
the prosecution and the defendant tell two incompatible stories, or the 
defendant offers an innocent explanation for the prosecution’s facts. Proof 
beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution version is true will prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant’s version or explanation 
is false, that is, that the defendant’s version or explanation is a lie. 
Such defence lies are determinative lies, lies without separate forensic 
significance. In such cases, any instructions about how to approach a 
defendant’s lies as separate items of evidence would be at best unnecessary, 
perhaps misleading error, inviting illegitimate bootstrap arguments. Only 
standard burden of proof instructions should be used.109
A defendant’s admitted or alleged non-determinative lies are another 
matter. Ordinary good faith foundation applies for admissibility.110 In 
theory, collateral finality applies for nonmaterial credit-only lies,111 
although, as with complainants, relevance to issue is readily perceived. 
What distinguishes such lies from complainant’s lies is that potential 
prejudice from prosecution evidence of defendant’s lies is recognised and 
defendant’s lies may be excluded as excessively prejudicial,112 perhaps also 
as involuntary.113
If evidence of a defendant’s non-determinative material lie is admitted 
and a factfinder believes the defendant has uttered the lie, there is a risk 
the factfinder will follow the “... natural tendency” of thinking that “if an 
accused [has lied/is lying], it must be because he is guilty and accordingly 
107 R v White (n 1 above). 
108 The leading EW case, R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, mentioned in Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR (n 99 
above) remains relevant in EW but lies directions are often incorporated into or replaced by 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34 directions relating to a defendant’s failure to 
previously mention a fact relied upon at trial, R v Clarke (Sean Leroy) [2014] EWCA Crim 854.
109 Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR (n 99 above) [37]; Jim Fai v HKSAR [2006] 9 HKCFAR 85; HKSAR 
v Gao Lian [2013] 2 HKLRD 1076; cf. HKSAR v Chan Kam Loi (CACC 410/2012), [88]–[90] 
(suspect on the facts); R v Burge; R v Pegg (n 105 above); Dhanhoa v R (n 105 above); R v Dehar 
[1969] NZLR763, 765.
110 HKSAR v Tsoi Chung Wang CACC000356/2004 (12 January 2006) [16]; R v Trochym [2007] 
1 SCR 239 (SCC).
111 CR Williams, “Lies as Evidence” (2005) 26 Australian Bar Review 313, n. 26. 
112 R v Peavoy (1997) 117 CCC (3d) 226 (Ont CA); R v White [1998] 2 SCR 73, [33]; R v White 
(n 1 above) [173].
113 HM Malik (n 6 above), paras [36]–[37], Rosemary Pattenden, “Using the Overtly Non-
Incriminating Statement to Incriminate: A Theoretical Framework” (1999) 3(4) E and P 217–
249. Cf. R v Hasan [2005] 2 AC 467 [53], [62].
HKLJ Vol 45_2014_Part 1.indb   67 11/05/15   2:48 PM
68 Janice Brabyn (2015) HKLJ
convict him without further ado...”.114 Or the factfinder may simply give 
the defendant’s lie far more evidential value than it can fairly bear.115
Common law judges everywhere have tried to address these risks 
with lie directions, wavering between treating defendant’s lies as implied 
confessions116 or as circumstantial evidence.117 In HK, the CFA attempted 
clarification in Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR.118
A lies direction is required if the prosecution relies upon the 
defendant’s non-determinative material current offence lie as supportive 
of the prosecution case, or there is a real “risk” that, rightly or wrongly, a 
factfinder might do so.119
HK law requires that the direction include the following: before using 
an alleged lie to support the prosecution case in any way, the factfinder 
must be sure, that is, satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt,120 as to the fact 
(i) that the defendant actually and deliberately uttered121 an identified 
material lie122 and (ii) that the defendant told the lie because “he is unable 
to account innocently for the evidence that has been given against him” 
or “there is no innocent motive for the lie”.123 The factfinder should be 
told of the possibility of innocent reasons for the lie, expressly referring to 
any reasons proffered by the defendant.124
Judges125 and commentators126 have recognised that an instruction 
to a factfinder that a lie may only be used to support the prosecution’s 
case if the factfinder is first satisfied beyond doubt that the lie was not told 
114 R v Broadhurst [1964] AC 441, 457; R v Goodway (1993) 98 Cr App R 11; Yuen Kwai Choi v 
HKSAR (n 99 above) [31], [32]; Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193, 211 (HC); R v White (n 112 
above) [22], [48], [57].
115 The factfinder makes a genuine attempt at assessing probative value but because, in the 
factfinder’s narrative, innocent people usually do not lie, possible innocent motives on the facts 
are undervalued.
116 Diane J Birch, “R v House and Meadows” [1994] Crim LR 683, Commentary, used “implied 
confession”, approved in R v Burge; R v Pegg (n 105 above). Malik (n 6 above), discusses a 
defendant’s lies in the context of admissions. Australian case law is complex, combining the 
language of “consciousness of guilt” with variable status: credit only, implied confessions, 
corroboration or circumstantial evidence, Edwards v R (n 114 above); Hedgeland v State of 
Western Australia [2013] WASCA 97; James v The Queen [2013] VSCA 55. 
117 HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing [1999] 2 HKLRD 155; R v White (n 1 above). 
118 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 113 (CFA).
119 Ibid.; R v Goodway (n 114 above); R v White (n 112 above); Edwards v R (n 114 above).
120 “Sure” is equivalent to “satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt”, Malik (n 6 above), para 6.49.
121 R v Burge; R v Pegg (n 105 above); HKSAR v Tam Kai Cheng (CACC 148/1996).
122 Materiality is surely a matter for the judge, not a jury, to determine; HKSAR v Huang Song Fu 
(CACC 141/2005), [27]. 
123 Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR (n 99 above) [39], following, respectively, Edwards (Aust) (n 114 
above), p 199 and R v Goodway (n 114 above), p 15, apparently considering there is no 
difference in meaning between the two.
124 HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing (n 117 above), 168H, approved in Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR (n 99 
above) [39].
125 HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing (n 117 above).
126 Katharine Grevling, “Silence, Lies and Vicious Circularity” in Peter Mirfield and Roger Smith 
(eds) Essays for Colin Tapper (UK: Lexis-Nexis, 2003).
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for an innocent or relatively innocent reason is logically and forensically 
problematic. The factfinder can only be so satisfied if first satisfied of the 
defendant’s guilt – but the defendant’s guilt is the very thing the lie is 
being used to support. Nevertheless, the direction persists.
A commitment to the discipline of logical relevance means that this 
approach must be corrected. First, the best approach for many equivocal 
motive defence lies may be exclusion as excessively prejudicial. Second, 
factfinders should be told expressly when an immaterial lie can only be 
relevant to credibility127 or that a lie is intractably neutral and has no 
probative value on a specific issue.128 Both points deserve emphasising.
Otherwise, correction requires unequivocal acceptance that a defendant’s 
non-determinative lies can at most only ever be circumstantial evidence of 
facts in issue. In such cases, the factfinder should be directed as to:
 (i) the use condition (disregard evidence of a lie unless sure the 
defendant uttered the lie);
 (ii) the live issue(s) to which the lie may be relevant and the nature 
of that possible relevance;
 (iii) the dangers of leaping from lie to guilt/lies alone can never 
prove guilt;
 (iv) the reality that (relatively) innocent people sometimes lie;
 (v) possible innocent explanations for the defendant’s conduct in 
the current case, including any motive expressly claimed by the 
defendant; and
 (vi) the duty to disregard any lie that the factfinder was sure was 
uttered for an innocent reason.
In these cases, what the factfinder needs to realise – and to be told – is 
that even if it is clear the defendant lied in order to conceal incriminating 
facts or to fabricate innocent facts, the defendant may – or may not – have 
lied to conceal the defendant’s guilt of the offence charged. If the lie is one 
that a “relatively” innocent person may have uttered, whether to avoid 
127 HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing (n 117 above); Diane Birch, R v Tucker [1994] Crim L.R. 683 
commentary, p 684, Diane Birch, R v Landon [1995] Crim LR 338 commentary; R v Zoneff 
(2000) 200 CLR 234; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316, [44].
128 Judges differ greatly in their willingness to find “no probative value” on particular facts, a point 
illustrated most clearly in the various judgments in R v White (n 1 above). See also CR Williams, 
“Post-Offence Conduct and Included Offences” (2007) 31 Crim LJ 208; R v Hawkins [2011] 
NSCA 6; R v Palmer [2010] ONCA 804; R v Arcangioli (n 36 above) [43], R v White (n 112 
above) [26]–[29]; HKSAR v Chau Kwok On CACC 131/2001 (28 November 2002); R v Ciantar 
[2006] VSCA 263; R v Hays [2009] NSWCCA 228; R v Richens (n 106 above); R v Henson 
(n 101 above); R v Miah [2003] EWCA Crim 3713; Bullen v R (n 104 above).
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wrongful accusation/conviction or some more specific reason raised by the 
defendant, the fact the defendant chose to utter it is a piece of admissible 
evidence about which two stories may be told. The relative strength of 
those stories is a matter for the properly warned factfinder to consider in 
the context of all the other evidence in the case.
This is very like Rothstein J’s much-quoted statement of the law in 
R v White,129 except Canadian law reserves the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard to final evaluation of the prosecution case only.130 The argument 




Logically, evidence of officers’ non-current offence perjury, fabrications, 
spoliation, subornation and job-related lies, even other criminal 
deceptions, could have substantial imputation plausibility and warning 
value as to general credibility. Evidence of a lie similar to the lie alleged in 
the current case could support simple propensity arguments. Multiple lies 
could support inferences of system, plan or, exceptionally, habit. Whether 
analysed as relevant to the officer’s case-specific credit or more directly 
to issue, such propensity evidence could directly support inferences of 
planting of evidence or contraband, fabrication of confession evidence, 
uttering of threats or violence as alleged.
Potential relevance to credit has been accepted in principle131 but 
approached very cautiously in practice and hampered by disclosure 
issues.132 In EW and HK the field was dominated for many years by the 
129 R v White (n 1 above); R v Rogerson [2014] ONCA 366. This author is more sympathetic to 
Binnie J’s dissent on the facts but the strict approach to intractable neutrality is less suited to 
statement lies. See also the short version of lies direction previously used in HK, HKSAR v Mo 
Shiu Shing (n 117 above). Unfortunately, HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing suggests an unhelpful overlap 
between circumstances requiring a short or “full” direction. In Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR, the 
CFA pointed trial judges to HKSAR v Mo Shiu Shing forms of instruction, but in HKSAR v 
Huang Song Fu (n 122 above), the CA interpreted Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR as requiring the 
use of the Yuen Kwai Choi v HKSAR version in every case. The CFA has not commented.
130 R v White (n 112 above) [55]. A “beyond all reasonable doubt” direction would be required 
when conviction depends upon the post-offence conduct.
131 R v Tang Ka Kit [1999] 1 HKC 678 (planting of drugs; clear video evidence, but judge stopped 
the trial; prosecution disclosure confined to newspaper cutting); R v Murray [2003] EWCA 
Crim 27; R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21 (overcome implausibility of defence claim); 
R v McGoldrick [1998] NSWSC 121 (28 April 1998); R v Hasenkamp [1998] NSWSC 40 (24 
February 1998); R v Lonie; R v Groom (n 63 above) [65]–[66].
132 Sufficiency of foundation for cross-examination of officers often arises in prosecution disclosure 
cases, HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336; R v McNeil (n 60 above). 
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approach of Lord Lane CJ in R v Edwards.133 As to relevance to credit, 
Lord Lane said that it would be “impossible and unwise to lay down hard 
and fast rules as to how the court should exercise its discretion [to permit 
questioning]” but emphasised that, while134
“… [t]he objective must be to present to the jury as far as possible a fair, 
balanced picture of the witnesses’ reliability, bearing in mind … the 
importance of eliciting facts which may show, if it be the case, that the 
police officer is not the truthful person he represents himself to be….
[Nevertheless, one] of the considerations … is the necessity of keeping the 
criminal process within proper bounds and avoiding the pursuit of side issues 
which are only of marginal relevance to the jury’s decision”.
Although deservedly called ungenerous, R v Edwards allowed some 
impeachment use of non-current offence officer misconduct. The EWCA 
accepted cross-examination as to disciplinary findings. Notwithstanding 
the general common law rule that findings of fact in one proceeding are 
irrelevant to the resolution of factual issues in another,135 the EWCA also 
permitted limited cross-examination as to the officer’s participation in 
other proceedings, unconnected with the current case. The reasons for the 
acquittal of the defendant, the subsequent quashing of the conviction or 
prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with a proceeding/contest an appeal 
must demonstrate “… the officer’s evidence to have been disbelieved”.136 
It is not entirely clear whether the focus should be the finding per se or the 
underlying conduct or both. Doubts about or dissatisfaction with aspects 
of the prosecution case; unresolved allegations against the same officers 
including pending criminal or disciplinary proceedings; allegations against 
others in the officer’s work unit, were all rejected.137 In 1996, in R v Edwards 
(Maxine),138 a differently constituted EWCA quashed a conviction 
dependent upon officers of the disbanded Stoke Newington Drugs 
Squad even after investigations had concluded without prosecutions or 
disciplinary charges. Beldam LJ observed:139
133 [1991] 1 WLR 207, distinguished in HKSAR v So Kon Tung (n 81 above).
134 Ibid., pp 216–219, approved in HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) on this point.
135 See Hui Chi Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34; R v Davies and Jones [1996] QB 283.
136 R v Edwards (n 76 above), p 217. New scientific tests showed rewriting of allegedly contemporaneous 
records.
137 Ibid., p 216. This decision was reached in the teeth of a gathering swell of independent complaints 
and quashed convictions involving officers throughout the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad 
from which the officers in the current cases came.
138 [1996] 2 Cr App R 345.
139 Ibid., p 350. EW prosecutors must now confirm with the relevant judge whether adverse 
comments about a prosecution witness amount to an “adverse finding” that should be disclosed 
in future proceedings, Crown Prosecution Service Disclosure Manual 2005, Legal Guidance, Ch 
18, paras 51–53.
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“Once the suspicion of perjury starts to infect and permeate the cases in 
which the witnesses have been involved, and which are closely similar, the 
evidence … becomes as questionable as it was in the cases in which the 
appeals have already been allowed”.
However, a later Stoke Newington Drugs Squad case, R v Guney,140 
preferred Lord Lane’s stricter approach, looking closely at specific findings 
for specific officers, although also noting the jury’s specific knowledge of 
the investigation into the Squad in the current case and probable real-
world understanding as to the discreditable conduct and “considerable 
pressures … requiring misplaced loyalty” in some police units.141 Later 
still, R v Edwards (Maxine) enjoyed a revival in cases involving another 
corrupt squad.142 The result is that both R v Edwards and R v Edwards 
(Maxine) remain available for EW judges to invoke in appropriate cases.143
R v Edwards144 and R v Guney145 were each expressly applied in 
HK in cases involving conduct closely related to the current case, in 
reality relevant to issue cases. Then, in HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming, in a 
decision expressly confined to credibility, the CFA overtly departed from 
R v Edwards, holding that in order for questioning about an officer’s 
testimony in an earlier case to be permitted:146
“[i]t must be clearly established that: (1) The verdict of acquittal in the 
previous case involved a finding by the court that the witness in question 
had lied (or which amounts to the same thing, that the court had disbelieved 
the witness); and (2) The circumstances of the previous case are of such a 
kind when compared to those in the instant case and the previous finding 
is not so remote in time that the finding of lying in the previous case would 
materially affect the court’s assessment of the witness’s veracity”.
On the facts, the CFA majority insisted that the magistrate’s reasons be 
taken as written. They noted the magistrate’s statements that, as between 
140 [1998] 2 Cr App R 242. Guney’s conviction was eventually quashed in 2003, in the light of 
further information casting doubt on the integrity of some officers involved, R v Guney [2003] 
EWCA Crim 1502. The CA emphasised that the earlier approach was not wrong in light of 
what was known by the court at the time. With respect, what was then known was that there 
was widespread corruption in the Squad.
141 R v Guney (n 47 above), pp 260–261, 264. With respect, if not disingenuous, this demonstrates 
an astonishing preference for rumour and public media over tested evidence.
142 R v Zomparelli (No 2) (23 March 2000 unreported); R v Martin 2000 WL 989317; R v Fraser 
(Lloyd George) [2003] EWCA 3180.
143 See R v Francis (Devon Lloyd) (n 60 above); R v McMillan [2012] EWCA Crim 226; Foran v The 
Queen (n 29 above), both West Midlands Drug Squad cases.
144 R v Li Chi Hung CA No 18 of 2002; HKSAR v Chan Hon Man HCMA 455/97; R v Chan 
Lap Man HCA Nos 372, 373/1995; R v Lam Wai Keung (n 83 above), R v Lee Man Liu 
(n 83 above). 
145 R v Tang Ka Kit (n 131 above), the discovery case previously noted. The prosecution was 
required to disclose the trial transcript, relevant video tapes and CAPO materials.
146 HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming (n 1 above) [46].
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an officer and the defendant, the possibility the defendant’s version was 
true was greater and that there were “dubious points” in the prosecution 
case, but concluded these findings were insufficient. Dissenting, Bokhary 
PJ emphasised the dependence of the system on the integrity of officers 
and the need for “judicial vigilance” and “a prudent judicial attitude”. In 
circumstances where there was no room for genuine misunderstanding, 
the magistrate having preferred the defendant’s evidence, “it necessarily 
follows that he disbelieved the officers’ evidence”. With respect, the 
latter approach better accommodates understandable judicial reluctance 
to make findings of lying when expression of doubt is sufficient.
As to the second threshold, Li CJ noted that it “has not yet received 
full attention in the English cases”. True but earlier Australian147 and 
subsequent EW authorities148 do now specifically reject any requirement 
of similar circumstances for relevance to credit. Willingness to corrupt 
the forensic process in any way is sufficient. Not surprisingly, applications 
of HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming have been restrictive,149 although not 
as restrictive as in North America where findings of lying in other 
proceedings are rejected as inadmissible opinion, hearsay or extrinsic bad 
character evidence.150
As to relevance beyond credibility, back in R v Edwards, Lord Lane 
CJ was emphatic in his rejection of the possibility of any such relevance. 
Defence arguments alleging “a course of conduct or system” of “fitting 
people up” or even standard propensity arguments, however proved, were 
dismissed without explanation as “misconceived”. As a matter of objective 
reason, this was seriously problematic151 but persisted uncorrected in EW 
and HK for many years. Civil judges showed better reasoning. In Steel v 
Commission of Police of the Metropolis152 Beldam LJ observed:
“In my view conduct of this kind [previous fabrication of records of 
confessions] is so contrary to the expected standard of behaviour of an 
investigating officer that, if proved, it is capable of rendering it more 
probable that the plaintiffs’ alleged confession was not made and [proving] 
147 R v McGoldrick (n 131 above) (a Wood Commission case); R v Polley (1997) 68 SASR 227 
(cf. dissent of Prior J, citing R v Edwards (n 76 above)).
148 R v Malik [2000] 2 Cr App R 8.
149 HKSAR v Tang Chan Hung [2010] HKCA 139; HKSAR v Wong Kam Keung (HCMA 71/2014).
150 R v Boyne (2013) 293 CCC (3d) 304 (SKCA); R v Ghorvei (1999) 29 CR (5th) 102; R v 
Song [2001] ABQB 689 (R v Edwards approved); Peter Walkingshaw, “Prior Judicial Findings 
of Police Perjury: When Hearsay Presented as Character Evidence Might Not Be such a Bad 
Thing” (2013) 7 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 1. As to Australia, see Heydon (n 43 above), p 604; 
Roberts v State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 37; cf. R v McGoldrick (n 131 above).
151 See Pattenden (n 73 above), p 554; David Wolchover, “A Note on Previous Police Malpractice” 
[1992] Crim LR 863.
152 (18 February 1993, unreported); Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 305 of 1993, 
1993 WL 13725981. The plaintiff was seeking damages for wrongful arrest and malicious 
prosecution.
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that [officer] had no sufficient belief in the grounds of and an improper 
motive for, the prosecution of the plaintiffs…”.
This was approved in 2006 in O’Brien v Chief Constable of South 
Wales  Police,153 another civil case brought by wrongfully convicted 
defendants alleging evidence of corrupt misconduct by officers. The 
R v Edwards exclusion of any possibility of relevance to issue for such 
evidence was expressly rejected. Simple logic could establish relevance to 
issue for defence evidence of the prior bad acts of officers. Admissibility 
would depend upon case management concerns.154
For Lord Bingham, the public interest in exposing official misfeasance 
and protecting the integrity of the criminal justice system and the 
importance of the evidence to the defendant’s ability to overcome his 
disadvantage in establishing his version of events against that of the 
officers were important factors.155 Surely, these factors strongly suggest 
that criminal defendants need at least the same impeachment options as 
their civil counterparts. It is better to prevent wrongful convictions than 
to provide compensation for wasted years in prison.
In current EW, CJA2003 s 100 specifically contemplates defence use 
of bad character evidence to found standard propensity arguments relevant 
to issue but subject to the “substantial probative value” and “substantial 
importance in the context of the case as a whole” admissibility conditions 
noted above. Bokhary PJ expressly recognised the possibility of defence 
similar fact arguments on appropriate facts in his HKSAR v Wong Sau 
Ming dissent.156 However, in HKSAR v Hung Wai Yip,157 notwithstanding 
reference to Australian case law adopting standard relevance to issue 
for defence impeachment evidence and at least partial rejection of 
R v Edwards by the majority in HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming, the HK CA still 
could not see beyond relevance to credibility.
Complainants
Complainants seem exceptionally vulnerable to any credit attack, but only 
defence use of (alleged) non-current offence false158 complaints of sexual 
153 O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (n 64 above) [50] (Lord Phillips).
154 Ibid., [3]–[7] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), [41], [53]–[57] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers), 
[69]–[77] (Lord Carswell) (with consequential rejection of stigmatizing some evidence as “mere 
propensity” evidence when propensity may be the source of its relevance and strong weight).
155 Ibid., [5]–[6] (Lord Bingham), [55], [60] (Lord Phillips). See also Jordan’s Application for Judicial 
Review [2014] NIQB 11.
156 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 192 [67]. 
157 [2014] 2 HKLRD 470.
158 Multiple victimization is not uncommon. Falsity is essential for relevance, R v RT; R v MH 
[2001] 1 Cr App R 22 [41]; R v Lawrence (n 36 above); Chapman (n 91 above).
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criminality is discussed here.159 A false complaint is a voluntary complaint 
known by the maker to be factually untrue but which the maker intends 
or is willing that others will at least act upon, to the detriment of a named 
person, group of persons and/or the criminal justice system.160 Like officer 
forensic misconduct, any such malicious lies have substantial imputation 
plausibility161 and warning value.162 However, unlike the situation 
with officer forensic misconduct, propensity arguments relevant to the 
complainant’s case-specific credit, even issue, are readily accepted.163 
Collateral finality is rarely invoked unless the imputation foundation is 
demonstrably weak.164 Good faith false allegations are said to be about a 
complainant’s lies, not sexual history.165
So again, the quality of the imputation foundation and proof are 
crucial, the more so since, in this context, the right to put questions and 
to prove tend to merge. Canadian courts are the most cautious.166 The 
EWCA has acknowledged the risks of groundless imputations and the 
need for judicial vigilance to protect complainants from the old stereotypes 
and prejudice,167 but actual practice still gives cause for concern.168 
159 There has been an explosion of empirical research in this area in the past decade: Mandy Burton, 
“How Different Are ‘False” Allegations of Rape from False Complaints of GBH?” (2013) Crim 
Law Rev 203; “‘True or False’: The Contested Terrain of False Allegations”, Australian Institute 
of Family Studies, available at www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/pubs/researchsummary/resume4/index.
html; “Charging Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in Cases Involving 
Allegedly False Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations” Joint Report to the DPP by Alison 
Levit QC and Crown Pros. Service Equality and Diversity Unit, available at www.cps.gov.
uk/publications/research/perverting_course_of_justice_march_2013.pdf. And see Philip NS 
Rumney, “False Allegations of Rape” (2006) 65 Cam. LJ 128; Jules Epstein, “True Lies: The 
Constitutional and Evidentiary Basis for Admitting Prior False Accusation Evidence in Sexual 
Assault Prosecutions” (2006) 24 Quinnipiac Law Review 609. 
160 Not angry or scared lies intended for parent/teacher/friend only; R v V [2006] EWCA Crim 
1901; R v Gauthier (1995) 100 CCC (3d) 563 (BCCA). 
161 Jeremy Gans, “Why Would I Be Lying?: The High Court in Palmer v R Confronts an Argument 
that May Benefit Sexual Assault Complainants” [1997] Sydney Law Review 29.
162 R v Baird (John) [2007] EWCA Crim 2887, cf. R v Davarifar [2009] EWCA Crim 2294. 
163 Neil Kibble, “Rape: Fresh Evidence – Evidence of Complainant Making Numerous False 
Complaints – Effect on Credibility” [2008] 5 Crim LR 394, cf. R v Blackwell [2006] EWCA Crim 
2185; R v Seaboyer (n 5 above), pp 615–616; Epstein (n 159 above), pp 621–621, 638–642 (rare 
comparison with officers).
164 R v Duckfield [2007] EWCA Crim 4; Diane Birch, R. v R. commentary [1999] Crim LR 909. R 
v S [1992] Crim LR 307; Etches v R [2004] EWCA 1313, [8]; R v MAG [2004] QCA 397; R v 
Lawrence (n 36 above). Chapman (n 91 above), p 146 at n 75 suggests that the permitted proof 
of “demonstrably false” prior allegations of sexual assault in Canada is a new exception to that 
jurisdiction’s already relatively flexible collateral facts rule.
165 R v S (n 11 above) [57]–[61]; Chapman (n 91 above), pp 146–148, although sexual history is 
often disclosed, especially where the disputed issue is consent.
166 Chapman (n 91 above), pp 155–159; R v G(S) 2007 CarswellOnt 2591, [40]–[55] (Ont S Ct of 
Justice); R v Blake (Ont S Ct of Justice, 24 January 2013).
167 R v RT; R v MH (n 158 above), p 22; R v Murray [2009] EWCA Crim 618.
168 Kelly, Tempkin and Griffiths (n 84 above), pp 14, 70–71, 74 criticize low-level scrutiny. Neil 
Kibble, R v Davarifar [2011] Crim LR 818 commentary shows variable judicial approaches to EW 
s 100 “substantial probative value” requirements.
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In HK, HKSAR v Wong Sau Ming apart,169 standard “reasonable grounds” 
applies.170 Complainant’s decision not to prosecute or to withdraw, police 
hearsay recordings of “no crime” or police/prosecution decisions not to 
proceed, frequently not based on perceived or actual falsity, should not be 
sufficient.171 Reliance upon the statements, even the testimony, of targets 
of the alleged previous complaints is permissible but provides the hardest 




In a contested criminal trial where the prosecution bears the burden of proof, 
rigorous objective reason requires us to conclude that, even when 
a defendant testifies or relies on the content of a mixed statement, 
most defendants’ non-current offence lies actually have very limited 
imputation plausibility, warning or propensity value. This counter-
intuitive proposition demands explanation.
First, a defendant’s credibility is not engaged by a bare plea of “not 
guilty”, even when a defendant points out weaknesses inherent in the 
prosecution case. Then, suppose the prosecution lead evidence of 
destruction of potentially incriminating evidence or possible subornation 
of a witness. Might proof of other non-current offence acts of evidence 
destruction and subornation tend to disprove the defendant’s claim of 
accidental destruction or innocent association in the current case? 
Logically, this might be so. What if the defendant mounts a substantive 
defence, testifying in support of that defence?
Again, non-current offence lies with a similar and distinctive content 
or character to the alleged current offence lie might be relevant as 
169 HKSAR v Chan Ka Man [2007] HKEC 675. Cf. R v Deboussi [2007] EWCA Crim 684, [31]–[35] 
(acquittal); R v Davies and Jones (n 135 above) (judicial findings in family proceedings).
170 HKSAR v Tse Hoi Pan [2006] 3 HKLRD 800, 804, citing R v Howells (sic Howes) [1996] 2 Cr 
App R 490, 498 but omitting the important point that in R v Howes, the EW CA also said, 
“… questions which have no foundation in evidence that would be admissible and could be 
placed before the jury if it was available for the purpose are likely to be excluded, because those 
questions amount to the kind of roving inquiry or unfounded assertions based on rumour and 
gossip which [the legislation] is intended to exclude”.
171 As to the basis for police classifications of “no crime”, see Mandy Burton, “Reviewing Crown 
Prosecution Service decisions Not to Prosecute” [2001] Crim L.R. 374 and R v Salaam David 
All Hilly [2014] EWCA Crim 1614.
172 As to the additional credit contests complainants may face, see R v Riley (1992) 11 OR (3d) 151; 
R v S [2009] (n 11 above) [54], Kibble (n 168 above).
173 Nothing special arises with respect to lies used as directly tending to prove lies-related offences 
or to correct a false impression created by affirmative evidence of a good character. As to the 
latter, see J Brabyn, “A Defendant’s Good Character in a Criminal Trial” (2004) 34 HKLJ 581.
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suggesting a particular method or practice of offending and defending or 
in some specific way make the particular defence improbable.174 Previous 
lies could also have imputation plausibility value where that is an issue.
Beyond that, even proven willingness to utter forensic corrupting lies 
based on non-current offence behaviour does not go beyond confirmation 
of what was already known to be probable; the defendant, like most 
defendants, may well try to avoid conviction by lying. But what we also 
need to remember is that innocent defendants of whatever character 
will often tell the truth.175 In other words, the overwhelming situational 
factor that is likely to determine whether the defendant’s current 
offence testimony or otherwise stated defence is a lie will be whether the 
defendant is innocent or guilty! Therefore, while proof of non-current 
offence lies may tend to prove that if this defendant commits an offence, 
this defendant will likely try to conceal evidence or utter testimonial lies 
to avoid being found guilty (a prediction of future conduct), as a matter 
of logic and experience, that fact does not increase the likelihood that 
this defendant committed the current offence or even that this defendant 
is lying now. This defendant’s commission of the current offence must be 
separately established first.176 The importance of a clear recognition of 
this position cannot be overstated.
Admissibility
Received common law wisdom states that admitting evidence of a 
defendant’s bad character increases the risks of reasoning and moral 
prejudice.177 Focussed empirical research is generally confirmatory.178
Therefore, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 220), s 54(1)
(f) prohibits the adducing of evidence or cross-examination of testifying 
defendants “tending to show the defendant has committed/or been 
convicted of/or been charged with any offence other than [a current 
offence] or is of bad character”, unless the evidence is otherwise relevant 
to issue or with the leave of the court. For present purposes, leave 
may only be given when the defendant has made imputations on the 
174 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 (“the Girl Guide murder”) provides an illustration. R v Belogun 
[2008] EWCA Crim 2006 could be explained in this way.
175 Levine, Kim and Hamel (n 15 above), p 281 (subjects were given an opportunity to cheat in 
a test and then later asked if they had done so. Variable majorities of cheaters falsely denied 
cheating but none of the subjects who had not cheated decided to lie when asked whether they 
had cheated. “Most people don’t lie if they don’t have to – at least most of the time”.)
176 The propensity shown by the non-current offence lie would then help predict how this guilty 
defendant would have behaved after commission of the offence but that is irrelevant to this trial.
177 Roderick Munday, Evidence (Oxford: OUP, 7th ed., 2013) 232.
178 As to the first, see the previous discussion about lies. As to the second, see Munday, ibid.; 
“Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings” Law Commission Report No 273 Cm 
5257 (2001) paras 5.18 and 6.33–6.45. Cf. Redmayne (n 6 above) (credible suggestion risks of 
reasoning prejudice at least may have been overestimated).
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character of the prosecutor/witnesses for the prosecution or has given 
evidence against any co-defendant. “Co-defendant gateway” evidence is 
said to be potentially relevant to issue and credit.179 “Prosecutor-witness 
gateway” evidence is relevant to credit only and so the factfinder must 
be directed.180 It is immaterial that the imputation was a necessary 
part of the defendant’s case, such as imputations alleging officer lies,181 
although emphatic denial or assertions of a complainant’s consent will 
not lose the shield.182 The residual discretion to exclude prejudicial 
prosecution evidence applies but is not generously used.183 The harshness 
and irrationality of the prosecutor-witness gateway has been repeatedly 
criticised.184
On its face CJA2003,185 s 101(1) and the various satellite provisions 
give defendants even less protection from prosecution evidence. The 
prosecution may prove a defendant’s non-current offence lies without 
leave in circumstances similar to the HK prosecution-witness gateway 
above186 and also as relevant to the defendant’s propensity to be untruthful 
whenever such propensity is an important issue between the prosecution 
and defence. There is a narrow judicial obligation to protect the “fairness 
of the proceedings”.187
However, judicial interpretation of the “propensity” limb has been 
restrictive. In R v Hanson188 the EWCA said that, apart from cases 
where the commission of the other offence showed a propensity for 
179 R v Randall [2004] 1 WLR 56, at least if offered by a co-defendant. 
180 HKSAR v Chan Hing Chi [1998] 1 HKLRD 184 (CA). The unreality of such directions 
where the convictions are of a similar character to the current offence or do not themselves 
concern lies is obvious; R v Watts (1983) 77 Cr App R 126; cf. R v Powell (1985) 1 WLR 1364 
(CA (Crim Div)).
181 R v Yiu Ka-Yin [1994] 2 HKCLR 223.
182 Selvey v Director of Public Prosecutions [1970] AC 304 (HL). The HL was aware that the exception 
for complainants had no ground in principle, save perhaps that an assertion of consent was 
inherent in any pleas of not guilty. The exception is entirely consistent with disparate treatment 
of complainants generally.
183 R v Yiu Ka Yin (n 181 above); R v McLeod [1994]1 WLR 1500, still cited with approval in post 
CJA2003 cases; R v Lafayette [2008] EWCA 3238.
184 “Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings (Report)” [2001] EWLC 273(2) [4.33]–
[4.69]; Roderick Munday, “The Paradox of Cross-Examination to Credit – Simply Too Close for 
Comfort” (1994) 53 CLJ 303; Peter Sankoff, “Corbett, Crimes of Dishonesty and the Credibility 
Contest: Challenging the Accepted Wisdom on What Makes a Prior Conviction Probative” 
(2006) 10 Can. Crim. L.R. 215, 225–235.
185 See excellent discussions of Peter Mirfield, “Character, Credibility and Truthfulness” (2008) 
124 L.Q.R. 1; Rachel Tandy, “The Admissibility of a Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A 
Critical Analysis of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” (2009) 30 Statute Law Review 203.
186 There is also an equivalent of HK gateway (ii), arguably setting a higher standard, see CJA2003, 
s 101(b). Admissibility is a matter of judgment, not discretion, potential relevance is as to 
propensity and/or credibility depending on the facts of the case.
187 CJA2003, s 101(3)(4), time between matters being singled out as a factor to consider. The 
obligation only arises upon application.
188 [2005] 1 WLR 3169, [13].
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untruthfulness, not merely dishonesty,189 a conviction for another offence 
would only be relevant to a defendant’s propensity for untruthfulness 
if the defendant there puts forward an affirmative defence which the 
conviction shows the factfinder must have disbelieved.190 Then, in 
R v Campbell, Lord Phillips CJ fully recognised the limited relevance of a 
defendant’s veracity to credit noted above.191
“If [factfinders] apply common sense they will conclude that a defendant 
who has committed a criminal offence may well be prepared to lie about it, 
even if he has not shown a propensity for lying, whereas a defendant who 
has not committed the offence charged will be likely to tell the truth, even 
if he has shown a propensity for telling lies”.
Consequently, the defendant’s credibility would not be an important matter 
in issue between the parties for the purpose of the propensity gateway 
unless lies were told in the context of committing criminal offences with 
lying as an element of the offence.192 Glover and Murphy report that 
current EW practice is consistent with R v Campbell.193
However, the logic of R v Campbell has not yet been extended to the 
other EW gateways. Where such gateways apply, evidence of a defendant’s 
criminal record is relevant to the defendant’s credibility because to do so:194
“... accords with common experience. … The reason why [a defendant is 
entitled to adduce evidence of good character] is because ordinary human 
experience is that people of proven respectability and good character are, 
other things being equal, more worthy of belief than those who are not. 
Conversely, persons of bad character may of course tell the truth and often 
do, but it is ordinary human experience that their word may be worth less 
than those who have led exemplary lives”.
189 The HL viewed dishonesty as the wider term, including but not confined to the uttering of 
lies. In R v Edwards [2005] EWCA Crim 1813, [13] and R v Blake [2006] EWCA Crim 871, 
[25], the CA respectively rejected directions connecting convictions for theft and burglary with 
propensity to be untruthful. Cf. R v Garnham (n 58 above) [14]–[15] (as to a complainant’s 
numerous theft convictions).
190 Cf. R v Garnham (n 58 above) [16] (EWCA appears to reject this possibility in light of R v 
Campbell [2007] 2 Cr App R 28, [30]). Use of this form of argument was also rejected in principle 
in the Canadian case of R v Geddes (1979), 52 CCC (2d) 230.
191 R v Campbell (n 190 above) [30].
192 Ibid., at [31]. Glover and Murphy (n 1 above), p 182 describe R v Campbell as a “courageous 
decision”, presenting a “direct challenge to the will of Parliament” as expressed in the legislation. 
Cf. Tandy (n 185 above), p 210, Tapper (n 6 above), p 407 (notes incoherence with s 100 but, 
with respect, for prosecution witnesses at least this distinction is entirely justified in terms of 
logical relevance). 
193 [2007] 2 Cr App R 28, 182. Perhaps, but there are a number of judgments which fudge the 
point, as in R v Belogun (n 174 above), or uphold convictions notwithstanding admission of 
convictions they find irrelevant.
194 R v Singh [2007] EWCA Crim 2140, [12] (gateway (g)), approved in R v Speed [2013] EWCA 
Crim 1650 (gateway (b)). Neither case concerned lies – if they had, the point would have been 
stronger.
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As Professor Mirfield observes, this is standard prosecutor-witness 
gateway reasoning.195 However, the evidence may only be used to prove 
propensity to commit the offence, if otherwise admissible for that 
purpose.196
As to imputation foundation, convictions, disciplinary findings or 
admissions are common. The mere fact of even multiple accusations 
is rejected. EW courts accept the disputed testimony of third parties 
but case management is important. In R v Lowe the EWCA suggests 
the use of an enhanced proof beyond reasonable doubt condition.197 
Directions as to use/weight and warning against potential prejudice are 
mandated.198
Conclusion
The issue/credit distinction has proved to be a poor proxy for forensic 
relevance and probative value for decisions to lie by any significant 
participant in the criminal justice process. When recognised, the 
high probative value of much evidence relevant to case-specific credit 
puts the distinction under practical stress. Combined with collateral 
finality, the classification has also had the practical effect of favouring 
unproven imputations and speculation over proven fact. Uncertainty 
at the conceptual issue/case-specific credit interface ultimately leaves 
much room for subjectivity in application. It has facilitated failures in 
discipline with respect to defendants’ and complainants’ lies, and limited 
appreciation of the potential relevance for officers’ lies.
By comparison, use of a current offence/non-current offence 
starting point would mean a relatively clear and objective starting 
point for admissibility decisions with a relatively strong inbuilt 
correlation between relevance, high probative value and admissibility/
irrelevance or low probative value and inadmissibility. Supplemented 
by overt discussion of relevance and weight, this higher correlation 
would decrease distorting stress and reduce opportunities for rationally 
indefensible unequal impact within the justice system while leaving 
open the possibility of rationally justified individual, even class, 
exceptions.
195 Mirfield (n185 above), p 143. See also Roderick Munday, “The Purposes of Gateway (g): Yet 
Another Problematic of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” [2006] Crim L. R. 300.
196 R v D [2013] 1 WLR 676.
197 R v Lowe [2007] EWCA Crim 3047, [21]–[22] (express comparative reference to the lies 
standard); R v Lafayette (n 183 above) [36], [37]; HML v The Queen (2008) 245 ALR 204.
198 HKSAR v Zabed Ali (2003) 6 HKCFAR 192, [24] (CFA); R v Campbell (n 190 above).
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Current Offence Lies
Any party should be entitled to make good faith foundation imputations 
of and if denied to prove any person’s current offence lies without leave or 
other preconditions, except where, acting on an opposing party’s timely 
written application, the judge is satisfied that:
 (a) the particular current offence lie has no logical relevance to the 
actual issues in the case, including credibility;
 (b) good faith foundation is lacking; 
  or, with respect to a defendant’s lies only
 (c) excessive risk of prejudice would make the trial unfair; or
 (d) there is a real possibility the lie was made in circumstances that 
would justify the exclusion of a defendant’s admission, whether 
as involuntary, unreliable, in breach of recording rules, in 
violation of rights of access to legal advice or otherwise.
(Items (c) and (d) are to ensure that a defendant’s lies to persons in 
authority are subject to standard controls.)
This starting point of admissibility recognises the case-specific credit 
and possible liability relevance of the current offence lies of any witness or 
other person connected with the trial events. If implemented, the likely 
consequence would be admission of all good faith imputations of current 
offence lies against officers and almost all against complainants but, upon 
prosecution initiative or defence application, exclusion of, or credit-
only directions for, many contested or motive-ambiguous and potentially 
prejudicial defendant current offence lies. No form of collateral finality 
would apply.
Objective application requires that the fiction of officers as neutral 
witnesses be discarded and the potential of an officer’s possible current 
offence lies fully appreciated. An officer’s lie, demonstrating willingness 
to go to unprincipled lengths to ensure the defendant’s conviction, 
provides, in addition to strong warning value, both (i) strong case-
specific imputation plausibility support to the defendant’s contested 
claims of unlawful violence/bias/fabrication/planting/perjury/witness 
tampering and (ii) evidence of officer perception of weakness in the 
prosecution case. Defendants should not be artificially obstructed in 
making these points.
Objectivity also requires taking the limits of a defendant’s ability 
to prove officer’s lies seriously. A defendant’s statement as to what the 
defendant personally saw, heard, felt, smelt, or tasted must be a sufficient 
foundation for current offence imputations. Failure to support on oath 
should go to weight but only if “tit-for-tat” cross-examination as to past 
convictions is not available.
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Rationally, a defendant’s current offence lies should be treated as 
items of circumstantial evidence of variable weight. The lies direction 
should be modified as explained above to reflect this position. However, 
contested officer allegations of defendant’s lies should be subject to the 
same judicial scrutiny and admissibility conditions as contested officer’s 
allegations of defendant confessions. The enhanced proof standard for use 
of a defendant’s current offence lie should be retained.
Admittedly, the enhanced standard of proof is unusual for single items 
of circumstantial evidence anywhere. The need for this very strong use 
condition is clear with respect to alleged alibi lies or use of lies to support 
a weak identification. For an alibi, a possibility of truth is a possibility 
of innocence. Using equivocal evidence of a lie to support a weak 
identification is only to multiply uncertainty, defeating the purpose of 
the “need for support” rule.
There are also more general reasons. First, alleged current offence 
defendant’s lies do share one important feature with confessions: 
officer controls over how much evidence of the making of the alleged 
lie is generated, recorded, preserved and presented. Therefore, it is 
objectively fair that the risk of false positives, that is of false findings that 
a defendant uttered a disputed lie, should be borne by the prosecution. 
The defendant should have the benefit of any real possibility that the 
prosecution witness is lying or mistaken, and hence a real possibility the 
defendant is telling the truth. This should be made clear to factfinders. 
Second, since even a proved defendant’s lie often has substantial motive 
ambiguity, permitting an inference of guilty motive from an unstable 
base fact is to pile uncertainty upon uncertainty. If there is a real risk of 
forbidden reasoning, the special use condition should at least ensure that 
the defendant is being damned for a lie the defendant actually uttered. 
Finally, the use condition is also consistent with other bad character 
evidence.
Non-Current Offence Lies
No party should be permitted to cross-examine as to or adduce evidence 
of any person’s non-current offence lies unless, on an application for 
leave made only after or in conjunction with appropriate notice to other 
parties, the judge is satisfied as to the admissibility conditions of:
 (a) good faith foundation for the imputation, and
 (b) sufficient evidential value in relation to any target fact, 
whether by way of propensity reasoning or otherwise, such 
that it is clearly just to permit the imputations or evidence 
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notwithstanding (i) risks of reasoning or moral prejudice 
against a defendant or complainant/victim and (ii) issue 
diversion concerns.
Again, no separate collateral-finality rule should apply.
The starting point of non-admissibility without leave flows from the 
limited probative value of most non-current offence lies, and associated 
issue diversion, resource and defendant/complainant prejudice concerns. 
The onus should therefore be upon an adducing party to establish the 
justice of admission in the circumstances of the current case or of a class.
Objective case-specific relevance and weight analysis, sensitive to 
the different pressures and motivations of officers, complainants and 
defendants would likely mean the following:
 (i) Where a non-defendant’s credit is disputed, subject to good faith 
foundation only, non-current offence lies uttered by that person, 
perhaps by authorised others, when under a legal or professional 
obligation to be truthful or refrain from spoliation of evidence 
(including false allegations of criminal conduct) would have 
substantial imputation plausibility and warning value, justifying 
resource-efficient presumptive admissibility.
 (ii) Admissibility decisions as to good faith foundation for officer’s 
lies and the lies of a challenged officer’s close professional 
associates would take into account:
(a) the realities of proof control by officers and proof 
constraints facing many defendants;
(b) the realities of mutual support codes of conduct/honour and 
the implications of close, cooperative working conditions 
in law enforcement teams/units/precincts/forces;
(c) the high proof threshold for, and institutional resistance 
to, bringing disciplinary/criminal charges against law 
enforcement officers;199 specifically, evidence that would 
require a conviction be quashed on appeal would be 
admissible at trial.200
 (iii) Prejudice-sensitive proactive judicial attention would be given 
to the good faith foundation for any contested allegation of 
non-current offence false allegations by complainants, with full 
awareness of motives for and ease of fabrication.
199 See Graham Smith, “Police Complaints and Criminal Prosecutions” (2001) 64 MLR 372; 
Burton ‘(n 171 above); David Warburton, “Drawing the Thin Blue Line: The Reality of Who 
Controls the Police” (2004) 135 Police Journal 77.
200 See R v Zomparelli (No 2) (n 142 above). 
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 (iv) Following the logic and discipline of R v Campbell, propensity 
to commit the charged offence and good character rebuttal 
apart, subject always to excessive potential prejudice of pros-
ecution evidence on the particular facts, admission of a de-
fendant’s non-current offence lies would only be justified when 
the content and circumstances of the non-current offence 
lie substantially increase the probability of the fact that the 
defendant’s specific current defence is also a lie.
 (v) Any separate “tit-for-tat” gateway for a defendant’s non-current 
offence lies would apply to general character attacks only and 
be acknowledged openly for what it is, without any pretence of 
relevance that such evidence does not have.
With respect, “tit-for-tat” gateways do not take the possibility of a 
defendant’s innocence and the reality of officer dominance over forensic 
processes sufficiently seriously. They threaten a defendant’s entrenched 
rights to (i) make full answer and defence and (ii) to be convicted only 
on the basis of probative evidence. They cost the criminal justice system 
the testimony of many defendants with criminal records and increase 
the opportunities for convictions based at least in part upon marginally 
relevant, prejudicial evidence without compensating benefits. Like credit 
advantages for officers and prejudicial attacks on complainants, tit-for-
tat gateways are relics of a more primitive age. Such disregard for the 
discipline of rational relevance is out of place in a 21st-century criminal 
justice system.201
Addendum
On 4 February, 2015 the Court of Final Appeal delivered judgment in 
HKSAR v Kong Wai Lun (2015) 18 HKCFAR 7. Kong Wai Lun was one 
of the defendants in the original trial of Hung Wai Yip.202 The potentially 
far reaching implications of this deceptively short judgment require a 
separate article. For the present it is important to note the following. 
First, there is unequivocal acceptance of the possibility of true similar fact 
evidence from defendants. Second, the CFA continues to use a relevance 
to credibility/ issue framework but one that is moderated by general 
201 See, eg, Commonwealth of Australia Evidence Act 1995, s 104(4)(5), Evidence of Bad Character 
in Criminal Proceedings (Law Com no 273, Cm 5257, October 2001) Draft Bill, clause 9. 
202 HKSAR v Hung Wai Yip (n 157 above).
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extensions of (i) an O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police203 
like framework of relevance and judicial case management to defence 
evidence in criminal cases and (ii) the Wong Sau Ming approaches to 
prior judicial screening and collateral finality flexibility to contested 
non-current offence conduct. Future comparison with the approach of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, set out in the recent case of R v Grant204 
will be instructive.
203 O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (n 153 above). Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers 
NPJ delivered judgments in both cases.
204 2015 SCC 9, judgment delivered on 5 March 2015.
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